



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION THROUGH THE USE OF  
SOCIAL INFLUENCE TACTICS: WHAT THE MILITARY  
CAN LEARN FROM RACIAL INTEGRATION OF  
BASEBALL IN ENDING “DON’T ASK DON’T TELL”**

by

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March 2012

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE March 2012		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Effective Integration Through the use of social influence tactics: What the military can learn from racial integration of baseball in ending "Don't Ask Don't Tell"			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Ernest O. Washington				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number _____ N/A _____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Framing tactics are used to structure a situation in an attempt to establish a "favorable climate" for influence. Framing can be used to influence the military or society to make decisions that are in your best interest (i.e. Jackie Robinson's allowance into major league baseball and the desegregation of the Armed Services) by structuring the issues at hand. The military may be faced with several options; however, introducing social influence tactics will alter his/her idea of what they believe to be their set course of action. Successful framing tactics are evident in how the military desegregated itself breaking from its long tradition of racial separation of decades past. Framing will present the military an optional course of action. This course of action is not desirable for some, but most will benefit from it, due to the fact that homosexuals will not be subjugated, scrutinized, or discharged for their sexual orientation. The idea behind this framing tactic is to have the military choose option A on their own accord. This thesis will explore the relevance of the Jackie Robinson situation and how it relates to the current military actions towards "Don't Ask Don't Tell" and to determine how social influence tactics were employed to achieve the desired result. There are several examples ranging from desegregation of African-Americans into the military to the current acceptance of gays into the military.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Type Keywords Here Framing, Social Influence, "Don't Ask Don't Tell, DADT, Cohesion, Negro Soldiers, Homosexuals, African-Americans			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 103	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  UU	

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TACTICS: WHAT THE MILITARY CAN LEARN FROM RACIAL  
INTEGRATION OF BASEBALL IN ENDING “DON’T ASK DON’T TELL”**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Framing tactics are used to structure a situation in an attempt to establish a “favorable climate” for influence. Framing can be used to influence the military or society to make decisions that are in your best interest (i.e. Jackie Robinson’s allowance into major league baseball and the desegregation of the Armed Services) by structuring the issues at hand. The military may be faced with several options; however, introducing social influence tactics will alter his/her idea of what they believe to be their set course of action. Successful framing tactics are evident in how the military desegregated itself breaking from its long tradition of racial separation of decades past.

Framing will present the military an optional course of action. This course of action is not desirable for some, but most will benefit from it, due to the fact that homosexuals will not be subjugated, scrutinized, or discharged for their sexual orientation. The idea behind this framing tactic is to have the military choose option A on their own accord. This thesis will explore the relevance of the Jackie Robinson situation and how it relates to the current military actions towards “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and to determine how social influence tactics were employed to achieve the desired result. There are several examples ranging from desegregation of African-Americans into the military to the current acceptance of gays into the military.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION (DADT OFFICIALLY ENDED ON SEPTEMBER 21, 2011) .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>BACKGROUND .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>PURPOSE.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS .....</b>	<b>3</b>
	1. Primary Research Question .....	3
	2. Secondary Research Questions.....	4
<b>D.</b>	<b>SCOPE .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>DECISION MAKING MODEL AND THEORY .....</b>	<b>8</b>
	1. Create the Psychology of Inevitable Change.....	9
	2. Establish Equal Status Contact with a Superordinate Goal.....	10
	3. “The Pee Wee Reese Principle: Puncture the Norm of Prejudice” .....	11
	4. Practice Nonviolent Resistance.....	11
	5. Create Empathy .....	12
	6. Individuate the New Group Member.....	12
	7. Offer Forgiveness and Redemption.....	13
	8. Undo the Perception of Preferential Selection .....	13
	9. Identify and Remove Institutional Barriers .....	14
<b>C.</b>	<b>SOCIAL INFLUENCE.....</b>	<b>14</b>
	1. Counter Frames to Support Integration Policy .....	15
	2. Storytelling.....	16
	3. Limiting and Controlling the Number of Choices and Options ....	17
	4. Set Expectations .....	18
	5. Agenda Setting: Determining What Issues Will Be Discussed .....	18
	6. Metaphor .....	19
<b>D.</b>	<b>SOCIOLOGICAL VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF FRAMES.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>CASE STUDY LITERATURE.....</b>	<b>21</b>
	1. Jackie Robinson .....	21
<b>F.</b>	<b>CHAPTER SUMMARY.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>III.</b>	<b>METHOD .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>THE CASE STUDY METHOD.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>CASE STUDY DESIGN .....</b>	<b>23</b>

C.	COLLECTING EVIDENCE .....	25
IV.	THE CASE OF BLACK MILITARY COMPETENCY .....	27
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	27
1.	History of African-American Soldiers Prior to World War II.....	29
2.	African-American Soldiers During World War II .....	33
3.	African-American Soldiers after World War II .....	36
a.	<i>Desegregation in the Navy</i> .....	36
b.	<i>Desegregation in the Army</i> .....	37
c.	<i>Impact of Executive Order 9981 (July 26, 1948)</i> .....	39
d.	<i>Summary</i> .....	41
e.	<i>African-American Soldiers from the Korean to Vietnam War</i> .....	45
B.	SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE.....	46
C.	LESSONS LEARNED FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND HOMOSEXUAL INTEGRATION INTO THE MILITARY.....	47
D.	DIFFERENCES IN AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND HOMOSEXUALS .....	51
E.	FOREIGN MILITARIES INTEGRATION OF HOMOSEXUAL POLICY .....	52
1.	Summary.....	59
F.	THE JIGSAW CLASSROOM.....	61
G.	HOMOSEXUALS IN THE U.S. MILITARY .....	62
1.	Military Policy for Homosexuals .....	67
V.	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	71
A.	CONCLUSION .....	71
B.	RECOMMENDATION .....	71
1.	Create the Psychology of Inevitable Change.....	73
2.	Establish Equal Status Contact with a Superordinate Goal.....	74
3.	The Pee Wee Reese Principle: Puncture the Norm of Prejudice..	74
4.	Practice Nonviolent Resistance .....	75
5.	Create Empathy .....	75
6.	Individuate the New Group Member .....	75
7.	Offer Forgiveness and Redemption.....	76
8.	Undo the Perception of Preferential Selection .....	76
9.	Identify and Remove Institutional Barriers .....	76
C.	FUTURE WORK .....	79
	LIST OF REFERENCES .....	81
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	87

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Lobby card for <i>The Jackie Robinson Story</i> in a scene where Mr. Branch Rickey interviews Jackie Robinson before announcing him as a member of the Brooklyn Dodgers (From Library of Congress, 1950) .....28
Figure 2.	Robinson as a second lieutenant in 1943 (From Gary Bedingfield, 2007) .....28
Figure 3.	Two African-American soldiers that won the Croix de Guerre from France during World War I. (From National Archives, 1947) .....30
Figure 4.	A platoon of Negro troops surrounds a farm house in a town in France, as they prepare to eliminate a German sniper holding up an advance. Omaha Beachhead, near Vierville-sur-Mer, France. (From Todd, 1944) .....34
Figure 5.	"Above and Beyond the Call of Duty." Color poster of Doris (Dorie) Miller by David Stone Martin. Poster dated 1943. From the National Archives and Records Administration collection, photograph .....37
Figure 6.	Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis watches a Signal Corps crew erecting poles, somewhere in France. (From Cunningham, 1944) .....39
Figure 7.	Map of the Day (The Daily Beast September, 2011) (From, Andrew Sullivan, 2011) .....69

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## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Homosexuality Should Be Rejected or Accepted? (Survey Report, November, 2011) (From American Exceptionalism Subsidies, 2011) .....	57
Table 2.	(DADT Reax November, 2010) (From The Atlantic, 2010) .....	58
Table 3.	Who do Americans Prefer not to Have as Neighbors? (Sociological Images, 2006) (From Lisa Wade, 2010) .....	65
Table 4.	Increasing U.S. Public Support for Gays in the Military (Sociological Images, 2010) (From Gwen Sharp, 2010) .....	66

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## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I would like to express my gratitude to all of those who contributed to the successful completion of my thesis. Specifically, I'd like to thank Steve Iatrou and Anthony Pratkanis for their insight, effort, patience, and wonderful sense of humor in guiding me through this process. I don't know if I could complete this rigorous task without their help. Thank you.

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# **I. INTRODUCTION (DADT OFFICIALLY ENDED ON SEPTEMBER 21, 2011)**

## **A. BACKGROUND**

April 10, 1947, was an historic day in the history of African-Americans: “The setting was old Ebbets Field in Brooklyn, NY where more than 14,000 baseball fans were on hand to see the Brooklyn Dodgers play their top minor league ball club, the Montreal Royals, in one of the preseason’s last exhibition games. At the top of the sixth inning, Dodger announcer Red Barber read the following statement from Dodger President, Branch Rickey for fans listening on the radio: “The Brooklyn Dodgers today purchased the contract of Jackie R. Robinson from the Montreal Royals. He will report immediately.” Five days later Robinson donned a Dodgers uniform with the number 42, and became the first African-American since 1887 to play baseball in the all-white major leagues. (Pratkanis & Turner, 1994, p. 43)

When Mr. Branch Rickey opened the doors for Jackie Robinson to play in major league baseball, not only did it break down the discriminatory barriers of the baseball organization, but it led to the future integration of other organizations for African-Americans around the U.S.

Leading social change in organizations is a difficult and politically dangerous balancing act. These risks increase if the social change in question directly challenges accepted societal and organizational norms. This thesis examines the integration of the Brooklyn Dodgers baseball team as an example of a successful social change that challenged organizational and societal norms, which later led the military to fully integrate the armed services for African-Americans. The armed forces between 1940 and 1965 marked a change to its military racial policies. Overt, mandatory racial exclusion and segregation disappeared, and was replaced by formal racial integration and ostensibly race-neutral personnel policies that led to the military being the vanguard of fundamental

change in American society. Only the framing of social influence tactics set forth from military decision makers' in the integration process of African-Americans, can encompass in similar ways the successful transition from "Don't Ask Don't Tell". The nine principles of framing tactics Dr. Pratkanis states that Dodgers general manager Branch Rickey used, were guided by an understanding of the social implications of integration. Rickey's method also relied on an awareness of the differing perspectives of important stakeholders. Little research has been done on the impact of external factors, such as social influence, on the process of integration techniques for homosexuals in society. The science of social influence addresses the issues of how and why people change behavior, and cognition as a result of social forces (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 1).

There are four categories corresponding to a communicator's task of influencing an audience. They include: (a) establishing a favorable climate for the influence attempt (substantive or procedural framing), (b) creating a relationship with the audience (source credibility), (c) presenting the message in a convincing fashion, and (d) using emotions to persuade. This thesis explores the relationship between the "framing" aspects of social influence and the military decision making process as modeled by Mr. Branch Rickey.

The military's decision making process emphasizes the importance of human cognition. Influencing perception will impact the process because decisions are made as a result of what is perceived, regardless of whether what is perceived correlates to anything of substance in the physical environment (Lewin, 1936, p. 18). Therefore, it is the psychological framing of the decision maker that is shaped by social influence. This framing is often altered to reinforce the preexisting beliefs of both military and political decision makers. By examining how social influence has affected past decision makers, military and political decision makers can better understand how to mitigate the impact of such influences on future decisions. Framing tactics were used to influence individuals to choose a desired course of action. This course of action, which ultimately led to the military's integration of African-Americans and homosexuals, was the desired end state of the framing tactic. Military planners have used social influence tactics to successfully influence decision makers into choosing predetermined actions. Framing influence

includes structuring a situation in such a way that the target is likely to be receptive to a given course of action and respond in a desired manner (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 20). The target of influence is often an individual, however, there are situations in which an individual will convince himself of the legitimacy of his actions prior to using framing to influence how the message is delivered to the audience.

## **B. PURPOSE**

The purpose of this research is to analyze the impact of framing influence on the military decision making process during the integration of African-Americans/homosexuals. Understanding the military decision making process, and its ability to be impacted by social influence is as important today as it was when the military first desegregated the armed services for African-Americans in 1948. Military decision makers must understand how their thought processes are influenced by the tactics of framing in order for them to make the best decisions possible. This research examines the impact that framing influence has on shaping or altering an individual's cognitions.

## **C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

### **1. Primary Research Question**

Framing tactics can be used to influence either military decision makers or their audience, but how these tactics impact the decision making process is the question that this study has been designed to answer. Individual decision makers are often influenced into making decisions that: (1) support a predetermined course of action for their benefit, and (2) that support their own preconceived ideas/expectations. The primary research question of this thesis is: How is the military decision making process impacted by framing influence?

## **2. Secondary Research Questions**

This research must answer a few preliminary questions prior to answering the primary research question. The secondary questions are:

- How does the military decision making process work?
- What is framing social influence?
- What stage of the military decision making process, that was used in the integration of homosexuals/African-Americans, is impacted by framing social influence?

### **D. SCOPE**

The scope of this thesis encompasses:

- A discussion of the decision making theory developed by Mr. Branch Rickey and how the military utilized it for the integration process.
- A description of the science of social influence and the theoretical concept of sociological versus psychological aspect of frames.
- The analysis of the case study to answer this study's research questions and examining historical events of Jackie Robinson as it relates to the discrimination of African-American/homosexuals in the military to show how framing influenced the military decision makers.

### **E. METHODOLOGY**

This paper answers the research questions through a case study. The case study method allows researchers to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events as they impact human behavior. This research method can be used to answer its research questions by examining historical events as it relates to the integration of African-Americans and homosexuals in professional baseball and the U.S. military. This method is useful for identifying the impact of racial discrimination towards African-Americans in the United States. This will identify the impact of social influence on the

military decision making process as it played out in the real-world on African-Americans and homosexuals, non-laboratory or controlled conditions.

## **F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS**

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II is a literature review of the pertinent theories that will provide an overview of what nine principles of the decision making theory model Mr. Branch Rickey used, and the framing social influence tactics that led to military to change the decision making process. This chapter will also discuss the decision maker's use of framing to make the audience see only certain manipulated facts for the reasons homosexuals cannot serve openly in the military.

Chapter III will discuss methodology. It will review the case study design as a research method, as defined by Robert Yin, and will illustrate the thesis propositions. The designs for this work's case studies, as well as how this method applies to the theory identified in the literature review will be covered here.

Chapter IV will be the Jackie Robinson case study. This case study will examine how the use of framing social influence helped smooth his acceptance into Major League baseball. Also, this will look at historical examples of African-Americans and homosexuals in the military and see what framing tactics were used to segregate and integrate them into the military. Finally, the final stage of the Chapter is the successful transition from "Don't Ask Don't Tell".

Chapter V will provide a conclusion for the case study research as well as provide military personnel with recommendations on what other framing influence issues could be studied in the future. The conclusion will also identify areas for future research and discussion in the science of social influence and its impact on the military decision making process.

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## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

What is framing? Framing is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and constructed as having implications for multiple values or considerations. Framing can refer to a process by that people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue. A frame in a communication “organizes everyday reality” (Tuchman 1978, p. 193) by providing “meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson & Modigliani 1987, p. 143; 1989) and promoting “particular definitions and interpretations of political issues. ” (Shah et al. 2002, p.343) A frame in communication can be defined only in relation to a specific issue, event, or political actor. A frame could be used in turn to affect public opinion, by affecting the attitudes and behaviors of their audiences.

This study explores two classes of framing, substantive and procedural. (Entman, 2004, p.5) The substantive and procedural frames were chosen because of how the military used certain influence tactics on integrating African-Americans and homosexuals. This study was conducted to see if this was done at “face value”, or done at a much narrower focus of one dominate issue that made the military decision makers change their long standing policy of discrimination. In part, substantive framing of the communication is received on the terms intended by the sender for example—the military commander or another soldier—and taken at face value. Successful transmission of content relies heavily, although not exclusively, on recipients acquiring and using the substantive frame. The acquisition of the substantive frame is itself a process issue. Transmission of content is necessary, but not sufficient enough for learning to take place, that depends on a suitable fit being established between content and process. Substantive framing in this case was used to place a face of the issues that needed to be addressed in showing what consequences the military would face if they did not allow the integration of African-Americans and homosexuals (out-groups) into their organization. The

substantive frame refers to the material aspects or the facts of the dispute in this study to see what the military were stating the reasons for not allowing the integration of African-Americans and homosexuals. The procedural frame mainly narrowed the focus on how the issue was framed to influence the military to change its policy, by forcing the decision makers to make the choice we want them to. Procedural frames suggest evaluations of the political actors' legitimacy, based on their technique, success, and representativeness in changing military discrimination policies.

In part, two types of framing are used in the four areas of study. These four areas are (1) decision making model and theory, (2) social influence and framing tactics, (3) the concepts of cascading activation model cognitive development of perception shaping, and (4) historical examples of the impact of framing social influence tactics on military decision making. The literature review will set the foundation for analysis and validation of this study's proposition. It will also provide a departure point for future research.

## **B. DECISION MAKING MODEL AND THEORY**

To make a decision, people need to select or highlight some facets of events or issues, and make connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution. (Entman 2004, p.5) Mr. Rickey used this tactic to achieve success for his particular individual endeavor in the case of Jackie Robinson.

In order to understand how social influence impacts societal decision making, we must look at a substantive or procedural framing model of the decision making process. Substantive framing uses certain functions as it relates to the issues of integration of homosexuals in the military by identifying the political events, issues, and actors who play critical influence in the shape of:

- Defining effects or conditions as problematic
- Identifying causes
- Conveying a moral judgment
- Endorsing remedies or improvements



In the military's case, the problematic effect was trying to remove the institutional societal barriers of in-groups (Whites), for the allowance of out-groups (African-Americans and homosexuals) in organizations, by identifying the causes of why they were not allowed in organizations, and then attempting to change the stereotypes of people to see that the person is not that of a homosexual (Negro), but that of a human being (Jackie Robinson/General Benjamin O. Davis Jr.).<sup>1</sup> Racism in American society goes against the very make-up of its social norms and national identity. The only way America will be able to stand for the idealism of the Declaration of Independence that "All Men Are Created Equal" is to endorse solutions for cohabitation with groups, and find ways to improve relations of those groups for the better meant of society. The importance of the procedural framing element associated with the decision making process, would help the military influence society more by narrowing focus of the message. By not allowing the public to engage in voicing their opinions, it makes them select a particular set of elements that the audience has no choice but choose what we want them too. It is also important to directly change the institutions and social patterns that support the discrimination. This will result in the institution changing their attitude towards the particular idea of racism. Dr. Pratkanis stated nine principles that can be used to help with the integration of not only baseball, but for other organizations as well:

### **1. Create the Psychology of Inevitable Change**

This principle can increase the racial factor psychologically, if you let members of the military know that gays can serve openly in the military soon and there is nothing they can do about it. This principle was proven factually by psychologists in the 1950s and 60s researching desegregation. Another issue to inevitable change, is race relations in America. More often than not, the American Creed tells us that all people are treated as equal, but society dictates who is to be treated as equal and who is not. Most people in

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<sup>1</sup> General Benjamin O. Davis Jr. was the first African-American general in the Air Force and to graduate from West Point Military Academy.

society live their lives by trying to stay away from the issues of gays in the military, or Blacks in baseball for that matter; stating that this is the way things have been done and there seems to be no need to change. Gunnar Myrdal said, “Moral dilemma cannot be avoided when a change in the norms supporting prejudice are enacted; it must be faced squarely.” (Pratkanis & Turner, 1994, p.39) Prejudice...may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. This has relevance to the military when African-American and white soldiers were fighting side-by-side in U.S. wars, and were both dependent of the other to survive in the battlefield, or accomplish a particular task. Politicians and military leaders both have a responsibility to fully support gays in the military. Only then will the rest of society fall in line, because it will encourage change in the in-group members to the new social change structure.

## **2. Establish Equal Status Contact with a Superordinate Goal**

Most people believe that openly gay military members’ intergroup contact with other service members would lead to altercations. Social psychologists and sociologists came up with the equal status contact hypothesis, which states that positive intergroup relations can happen when the members from both groups: 1) have equal status, 2) have the same goals, 3) are dependent on each other to complete a specific task, and 4) interact with the support of the authorities, rules, or customs. Dr. Elliot Aronson, at the time a professor at the University of Texas, coined this “the Jigsaw Classroom” where students from different ethnic groups are put in a classroom through the active process of resolving social and cognitive conflicts by having to rely on each other to complete tasks assigned from the teacher. Another example, which Dr. Pratkanis shows us is by Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins. They said that blacks and whites had a better acceptance toward each other when they shared the same building in the ghetto rather than one that was segregated. Dan Dodson—a New York University sociologist, gave Branch Rickey the fuel to pursue the integration of baseball with this bit of advice, “Don’t worry about the attitudes of people who are asked to accept new members. When

relationships are predicted on the case, winning the pennant—the people involved would adjust appropriately.” (Pratkanis & Turner, 1994, p. 43)

### **3. “The Pee Wee Reese Principle: Puncture the Norm of Prejudice”**

Ordinarily, the factors leading individuals to form attitudes of prejudice are not piecemeal. The reason most people are prejudice, is the need to feel secure. Everybody wants to be safe in their surroundings with races they know, and once an outsider tries to enter into their livelihood (i.e., jobs, neighborhoods, or social events), they feel threatened by this, and want to get the “foreigners” away as quickly as possible. This is one of the leading problems in our society. For African-Americans, the “color of skin” has been the main basis of prejudice, more so than homosexuals, because a homosexual can hide the fact that he/she is gay, but an African-American cannot hide the fact that he/she is colored. It marks the difference between people’s, not only black skin, but also yellow and amber skin as well, that you are “not one of us”. One of the ways to rectify this, is by using “norms” to guide and change the social behavior of gays serving openly in the military.

### **4. Practice Nonviolent Resistance**

Just as the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. used nonviolent resistance in the civil rights movements of the 1960s to gain equal status for Blacks, nonviolent resistance can change the dynamics of social interaction. Just think, what if Jackie Robinson had used violence when one of the opposing players spiked him at first base? We would then be talking about more of Jackie Robinson the “angry Negro” than Jackie Robinson the humble athlete who broke down the color barrier. Jackie is just an example of how nonviolence made an irrevocable commitment to a course of action and forced a change in major league baseball. Nonviolent action says, “No matter what you do to me, I will not hurt you; I will, however, continue to move to the new goal of racial equality.”

The same can be said for homosexuals who are attacked and beaten for being different. If the person wants to change something, then they will have to do it with closed fist, and it forces that enemy to be converted to your cause.

## **5. Create Empathy**

An in-group can feel emotion or empathy for an out-group. This can help change the prejudices of the in-group members for that particular out-group. If one race feels emotion or empathy for another race, then this may change that races' view on the stereotypes of that particular race. This is true if one person sees another person in pain. The person tends to feel sorrow for that individual, no matter what race he/she is. When people have homosexual friends, they are more receptive to fight for equality for the particular dimension.

## **6. Individuate the New Group Member**

One problem that occurs when an out-group member joins an in-group is the continued categorization of the new member in terms of out-group stereotypes—the person is not “homosexual” but a military service member. This can cause problems when labeling such categories for integration. Somebody can always throw rocks from afar, but never do the same when face-to-face with the human being of the stereotype. Out-group stereotypes originate from in-group members in part to misperceptions or unsubstantiated information that has not been proven factually, whereas that new group member (homosexual or African-American) is seen to be here because of situational factors or luck. Another problem is the in-group can't adjust to the new desegregated environment in their solo or token status. Dr. Pratkanis said that one way to counter this is to reduce categorization and encourage the treatment of the new group member as an individual not a race or sexual gender.

## **7. Offer Forgiveness and Redemption**

In the many ways the issue of homosexuals in the military and society can be viewed as one elaborate cognitive dissonance experiment-forcing people in the military to confront Myrdal's dilemma. First, through the psychology of the inevitable, place pressure on the military leadership as a whole the organization to change their prejudices of openly gay service men and women. Next, you should block off the negative but typical routes for dealing with Myrdal's dilemma such as derogating homosexuals, bolstering negative stereotypes, and hatemongering.

## **8. Undo the Perception of Preferential Selection**

Many people doubt homosexuals have the ability to be effective leaders in the military because of their non-masculine nature. "We would argue that exclusion of gay men and lesbians is also based on factors unrelated to job performance." (McDaniel, 1989) As in most situations in society, people perceived this as they did in the case of Jackie Robinson, that he was picked because of affirmative action. It can have consequences due to the misperception that homosexuals cannot do their job or perform in combat situations. The perception that homosexuals in society are preferentially hired is ridiculous. Social psychologists have identified three general reasons why affirmative action can be looked upon as preferential selection or treatment. The first is racism. Widespread, strongly held beliefs that homosexual themselves are security risks, mentally unstable, cowardly, and lacking discipline to do their job. So, if they got the job then it must mean affirmative action...right? Audrey Murrell and her colleagues find that acceptance of affirmative action is higher among those whites who feel relatively deprived, or perceive that they have not gotten all that they deserve from life. In such cases, attitudes towards affirmative action serve a self-protection or scapegoating function—the dissatisfied individual comes to blame blacks for his or her problems. (Pratkanis & Turner, 1994, p. 57) One way that this can be resolved is by reaffirming that the individual was not preferentially selected, and also, make sure to everybody knows why that individual was hired, not by policy, but by merits.

## **9. Identify and Remove Institutional Barriers**

Out-groups are excluded from the in-group by more than just interpersonal prejudice; they are restricted on certain institutional practices of choices and rights by in-groups. Such practices can be subtle and rights of an out-group. Such practices can be subtle and unintended or blatant and intentional. An example, is the current living standards of the majority of out-groups in society, limited to no job opportunities to support one's family and the even poorer school systems in out-group areas. Complete integration could only occur with the military using voluntary integration as a substitute for the dismantling of the DADT laws of segregation. To accomplish this implementation of policy, tolerance for gays will likely require strong civilian authority from the President or the Supreme Court, as well as strong military leadership.

### **C. SOCIAL INFLUENCE**

The study of social influence documenting its effects on individuals can be traced back to the late 19th century to Gustave Le Bon's work, *Psychologie de foules* (The Crowd). However, it was only recently that a social psychologist categorized its different methods and tactics. The definition of "framing effects" by Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, says "framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about issue." (Chong, Druckman, 2007, p. 104) In an edited book, *Projections of Power*, Robert M. Entman identifies different methods of framing. He identifies two distinct social influence framing tactics and compartmentalizes them into two categories: substantive and procedural framing. The framing has three different classes of objects focused on in this study: political events, issues, and actors (which are certain groups, leaders, or countries). This study will focus on the social influence tactics that pertain to the cascading activation model of framing.

The cascading activation model is, "designed to help explain how thoroughly the thoughts and feelings that support a frame extend down...through the rest of system from

the military to society or vice versa”. (Entman, 2004, p. 9) To illustrate this concept, he shows how a cascade can flow off influence in a system from the administration, other elites, new organizations, and the public in general by using the example: “how thoughts or nodes on a knowledge network within an individual’s mind (whether a Congress member, a reporter, or citizen) has parallels in the way ideas travel along interpersonal networks and in the spread of framing words and images across the different media.” (Entman, 2004, p. 9) In the framing effects scenario, when asked if they would support or oppose allowing hate groups to hold a political rally, 85 percent of the respondents answered in favor if the question was framed as: “Given the importance of free speech,” where the other 45 percent were in favor if the question was framed as: “Given the risk of violence” (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). In any case, the alternative phrasing of the same basic issue significantly altered the meaning of how it was presented to the respondents, even when the change was identified by the person asking the question. How the problem is represented will impact how a decision maker reacts to and addresses the situation. This process of information analysis is part of *military policy* stage. The military may present information in a certain manner to influence society. Framing through the dissemination of misinformation to a target of influence can be used to influence people in an indirect manner. Military framing of integrating homosexuals shares the underlying principle of desegregation of African-Americans in the military. The military’s policy needs to be aimed at, “mandatory, wholesale integration of sexual minorities into the armed services.” (Brown & Ayes, 2004, p. 154)

### **1. Counter Frames to Support Integration Policy**

Counter frames is one method of influencing decision making targets that correlates to framing social influence. It is not defined as a social influence tactic; however, it is often used to support framing influence. The definition of counter-frame is a frame that opposes an earlier effective frame. There are three notable elements to this definition. First, a counter-frame comes later in time than the initial frame. Thus, we do not view simultaneous exposure to competing frames as counter-framing per se (this

would be akin to dual framing)—we assume the initial frame has been received earlier and processed separately. Second, a counter-frame advocates a position on the issue that is contrary to the earlier frame. Third, we assume the initial frame affected opinions on the issue, thus creating an incentive to counter-frame (otherwise a later frame would not be “counter” per se). An example of a counter frame would be an instance where many black working-class parents give their children nontraditional first names to provide them something special—and not with European American first that are commonplace. Such naming is a subtly type of resistance to whiteness. The definition explicitly means to be fully and clearly expressed; leaving nothing implied. Conversely, framing influence tactics can be used to strengthen the impact for integrating of homosexuals into the military by decision makers. Segregation of African Americans was based on factors (skin color and the discomfort of Whites) that were not directly related to the capacity of African Americans to perform their job. “We would argue that the exclusion of gay men and lesbians is also based on factors unrelated to job performance.” (McDaniel, 1989) Military commanders believed that black soldiers were lazy and didn’t have the intelligence to perform certain duties in the military. Another example of a counter frame would be an instance where during World War I, staff officers saw that the Negro soldiers fought exceptionally well in conflicts of different variations of duties. (Mandelbaum, 1952, p. 90) Unit cohesion is often used to describe why homosexuals are not allowed to serve openly in the armed services. The framing that the military uses is that gays and lesbians will decrease the military’s ability to function by harming the military’s strong levels of camaraderie and cohesion within the ranks. As in the same sense of integrating the Negro soldiers, the counter frame would be it’s not the issue with “unit cohesion”, in more of the fear and hostility that homosexuals would elicit from other soldiers is the main point here.

## **2. Storytelling**

Storytelling is an influence tactic that provides a causal structure to facts and evidence. “Stories determine the credibility of information, and ultimately direct



evaluation and choice about story-related decisions.” (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 26) The impact of storytelling on decision making is indirect, and, if effective, will influence the target’s perception of actual facts. Annette Simmons, author of *The Story Factor*, describes a story’s ability to mold perceptions and impact the subconscious mind. Most often, stories are used to influence thoughts and perceptions by presenting facts in a manner consistent with the communicator’s objectives. Simmons states, “A story can definitely undermine formal authority. It has been the tool of choice of more than one revolutionary.” Storytelling is a framing tactic that can be used to influence a target’s thought process by presenting information as more than just data. Pratkanis illustrates the concept of storytelling by describing a situation involving a jury’s decisions. He states, “When information was arranged in a story format, the mock jurors were more likely to render verdicts consistent with the preponderance of evidence compared to a mere listing of that evidence.” (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 26) According to this principle, a good story makes the facts more memorable and believable and, thus, it can impact the military decision maker in the process.

### **3. Limiting and Controlling the Number of Choices and Options**

The tactic of limiting and controlling the number of choices and options is often referred to as the “least-of-evils” tactic. This tactic is used to influence decision making by only offering two options, of which, only one of the options is desirable. Limiting the options does not eliminate the freedom to choose a course of action; rather, it provides the target of influence with the decision the influencer wants made. A target perceives that he or she is making decisions of their own accord, regardless of the fact that the alternate option has been presented as a decoy and has been predetermined to be undesirable. Military decision making is often influenced by this framing tactic. John W. McDonald describes an alternate scenario wherein too many options are available: “the intentions of friendly forces may be masked by presenting the enemy such an extensive array of options and alternatives that defenses of any one would create unacceptable vulnerabilities in other areas.” (Pfaltzgraff & Shultz, 1996, p. 149) This scenario

illustrates the decision making paralysis that results from the availability of too many options. Unlike the framing tactics identified by Pratkanis, this idea does not describe how to shape the situation, but how to overwhelm the target's thought process. The availability of too many options to process may lead to decision-avoidance, which in some circumstances may be the aim of framing influence. The objective is to have the decision making options seem legitimate so that the target will act based on his or her own accord. (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 23)

#### **4. Set Expectations**

The framing tactic of setting expectations is used to influence beliefs about the future. Dr. Pratkanis defines two ways this is accomplished: "First, expectations serve as a reference point by which options are judged. Second, expectations guide interpretations and perceptions to create a picture of reality that is congruent with expectation." (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 23) This tactic is used to shape the influence landscape, a concept similar to that of altering human cognition. If an individual sets expectations, they can create a reality that does not really exist. Acting upon the perceived reality may result in a "placebo effect, or self-fulfilling prophecy." (Pratkanis, 1992, p. 77) The practice of setting expectations has been used in the past by political leaders to help them convince themselves that the course of action they have chosen will succeed. This tactic has been used by past presidents during times of war to help influence the American public that U.S. involvement in a given conflict is the best option for the nation. This tactic can be applied to the *military policy* stage because this stage includes all cognitive perception development prior to making a decision.

#### **5. Agenda Setting: Determining What Issues Will Be Discussed**

The framing influence tactic known as agenda setting, "limits the discussion to those items on the agenda, thereby limiting the available information for discussion and formally excluding some options from being considered." Why is controlling information and limiting discussion important in social influence? Pratkanis states, "Issues placed on

an agenda appear more important and serve to define the criteria used in subsequent decision.” (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 25) This tactic impacts both pre-decision stages of military decision making model.

## **6. Metaphor**

The final framing tactic of interest to this thesis is the use of metaphor. According to Pratkanis, “Metaphors are effective influence devices because metaphors guide information processing (selective attention to details) and suggest solutions for resolving the issue.” (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 26) This tactic impacts the orientation stage of the decision making process. This tactic can be used by a communicator to shape his audience’s perceptions of a current situation by comparing it to a well-known historical event. For example, “The objections to racial integration of the armed forces bear striking similarity to the anti-gay rhetoric that currently supports the bans on gays in the military.” (Brown & Ayres, 2004, p. 169) The use of a metaphor is another framing tactic that is useful in influencing large audiences. The tactics described in the review will be applied to the decision making process in the case studies. These case studies are designed to use empirical evidence to illustrate the impact of framing influence on military decision making. This review sets the foundation to answer two primary research questions: (1) What decisions have military commanders made as a result of social influence (framing), and, (2) What decisions have commanders made in an attempt to socially influence a larger audience? These decisions will be the units of analysis for this study.

## **D. SOCIOLOGICAL VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF FRAMES**

Conceptually, framing can be said to have two board foundations—sociological (Entman, 1991; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974) and psychological. (Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998; Iyenger, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) Sociological means: the study of human social behavior, especially the study of the origins, organization, institutions, and development of human society; analysis of a

social institution or societal segment as a self-contained entity or in relation to society as a whole. Psychological means: influencing or intended to influence the mind or emotions.

In general, this research tends to focus on the “words, images, phrases, and presentation styles” (Druckman, 2001, p.227) that are used to construct news stories, and the processes that shape this study. Sociologically this study focuses on the framing the social behavior of the in-group towards the out-group (African-American/homosexuals). Goffman (1974) was one of the first scholars to have developed the general concept of framing. He helped to organize the information delivered in this study, into a conceptual research data to present to the world. Goffman calls frames the “schemata of interpretation,” a framework that helps in making an otherwise meaningless succession of events into something meaningful (Goffman 1974, p. 21). Gitlin (1980) defines frames as devices that facilitate how journalists organize enormous amounts of information and package it effectively for their audiences. According to Entman (1993), framing involves selection and salience—“to frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” (Entman 1993, p.52) Framing has had significant connotations in society as some aspects of reality have been framed to change an individual’s interpretation of issues differently; Jackie Robinson’s entering into major league baseball is a good example of this.

Besides examining media frames (cascade model), researchers have also studied audience framing as well. This can be looked upon by how different presentations of the same message can affect the choice the audience makes. The “emphasis” (Druckman, 2001, p.230) approach to framing demonstrates that accentuating certain considerations in a message can influence individuals to focus on those particular considerations. It has been said by scholars, (Iyengar, 1991; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999) “to frame a manipulation of something, one cannot influence an audience without changing some of the facts of the message.” Instead, emphasis framing effects refer to situations when, by “emphasizing a

subset of potentially relevant considerations, individuals are led to focus on these considerations in the decision-making process.” (Druckman, 2004, p.672) The decision makers used framing to make the audience only see certain manipulated facts for the reasons homosexuals cannot serve openly in the military. The final component of the literature review is that of the Jackie Robinson story; which will be examined in the case study.

## **E. CASE STUDY LITERATURE**

### **1. Jackie Robinson**

Literature detailing the events of Jackie Robinson’s life was abundant. By narrowing the search to the information applicable to the Robinson and Rickey integration into baseball, a case study analysis was properly conducted. Three books in particular provided the valuable information needed for the Jackie Robinson case study introduction. 1.) *Mr. Rickey has his way Across the Board*, 2.) *The Year Cool Papa Bell Lost The Batting Title: Mr. Branch Rickey And Mr. Jackie Robinson’s Plea For Affirmative Action Nine—A Journal Of Baseball History And Social Policy Perspectives Vol. 2 No.2* by Dr. Anthony Pratkains and Marlene Turner, 3.) *Baseball’s great experiment: Jackie Robinson and his legacy* by Jules Tygiel. (Tygiel, 1997) These books describe the importance of how Branch Rickey and Jackie Robinson’s integration into baseball helped paved the way for the tearing down of racial barriers in society towards blacks. They help illustrate the significance of the Rickey’s framing tactics that were integrated into baseball. This case study also set the framework for the civil rights movement, and was useful in identifying the framing tactics used to influence societal norms.

## **F. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

The literature mentioned in this review provides insight into both Branch Rickey’s, and the military’s decision making theory, the framing of social influence

tactics, the concept of sociological versus psychological aspect of frames, and the Jackie Robinson situation, which all serve as the focal point for the case study. Both Branch Rickey's and the military's model illustrate the concept that military decision making is done based on certain criteria and events that lead to change ones perception or view of the social norms of society. By understanding the past events of discrimination, we can better understand how to cohabitate with homosexuals in the military and have the "unit cohesion" people want to exist.

### **III. METHOD**

#### **A. THE CASE STUDY METHOD**

The case study method allows researchers to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events as they impact human behavior. This research method can be used to answer research questions by examining historical events as they relate to the integration of African-Americans and homosexuals in professional baseball and the U.S. military. Other social science research methods include surveys, experiments, and archival analysis; however, these methods are best suited for answering the quantitative research questions of “what,” “how much,” or “how many”? Case studies do not require the control of behavioral events, and may be used to answer the “explanatory” research questions of “*how*” or “*why*” decisions are made. This method is useful for identifying the impact of racial discrimination towards African-Americans in the United States. Historical analyses of Jackie Robinson will be the foundation of this thesis. This will identify the impact of social influence on the military decision making process as it played out in the real-world on African-Americans and homosexuals.

#### **B. CASE STUDY DESIGN**

Robert Yin, author of *Case Study Research*, identifies the five components of case study design: (1) A study’s question, (2) It’s proposition, (3) It’s unit of analysis, (4) The logic linking the data to the propositions, and (5) The criteria for interpreting the findings. As mentioned earlier, the case study method is applicable because it is best designed to answer *how* or *why* rather than the questions of *how much*, *where*, or *how many* typically associated with analytical studies. The case study will begin with a background to the conflict. This background section will provide a brief history of the conflict, including the belligerents, dates, and the social influence media available for the given time period. This study consists of the following case study components:

1. *The study's question:* How does framing social influence impact U.S. society and military decision making in order to facilitate a successful transition from "Don't Ask Don't Tell?"
2. *Its proposition:* Framing social influence tactics can be used to impact the decision of politicians, military leaders, and society to change the discriminatory integration policies toward African-Americans/homosexuals in the armed services.
3. *Its unit of analysis:* The unit of analysis for the case study will show how the military integrated the armed services, as a result of the framing influence tactics used. The social influence tactic identified in the case study will be the unit of analysis.
4. *The logic linking the data to the propositions:* This study will use "pattern matching" to show that, "several pieces of information from the same case may be related to some theoretical proposition." (Yin, 2003, p. 26)
5. *The criteria for interpreting the findings:* The case study will identify that changes to discriminatory policies for African-Americans/homosexuals in the military were thoroughly political in nature as a result of framing social influence.

Commonly referred to as research questions, the components of the case study mentioned above will be used to establish the framework of each case study (Yin, 2003, p. 22).

For the purposes of this study, the case will pertain to: (1) the different periods of interest to determine what framing tactics were used to influence the military's decision (2) the framing influence tactic used to influence either an individual by a group or the framing influence tactic used to influence a group by an individual.

The case will identify the Robinson case and the options that were available to them. It is necessary for the case study to identify more than one option in order to illustrate the role social influence plays in shaping the decision making process.

Decisions often depend on how a set of options is framed. Framing influence tactics can be applied to the decision making process by altering society or military



perceptions of the available options. The case study will offer a historical perspective of events and decisions shaped by social influence. The logic linking data to propositions and criteria for interpreting the findings, steps four and five, are the preliminary stages of data analysis. Since the case studies are descriptive, the specific variables for each case (framing influence tactic) were defined prior to the data collection (Yin, 2003, p. 26). The criteria for interpreting the findings will include identifying and addressing rival explanations for the findings. Alternative options and data will be included in the data collection.

### **C. COLLECTING EVIDENCE**

The six sources of evidence for case studies are: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. This study relies on documentation as the primary source for collecting evidence. Documentation is stable, unobtrusive, exact, precise (usually quantitative), and may cover broad time spans that include many events. It is important for each case study to present concrete data. Using documentation sources mitigates the inaccuracy and selectivity that accompanies the other evidence sources. Robert Yin describes documentation as a primary source, “For case studies, the most important use of documentation is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources.” (Yin, 2003, p. 87) Other sources of evidence, such as direct observation and participant observation, are not possible because this study will focus on historical events.

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## **IV. THE CASE OF BLACK MILITARY COMPETENCY**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This thesis presents opinions and factual information derived from multiple sources. Many commentators state that baseball's "great experiment" offered a model of integration for the nation and the world. This can be looked upon as a milestone of the foundation of integration in the in-group institutional system.

African-Americans in society were treated as second-class citizens after slavery. When Jackie Robinson entered into major league baseball, it was a time when racial tensions were at a high level during the segregated Jim Crow society. Most Blacks in the deep south could not vote, or if they could, they were threatened at the ballot boxes or had crosses burned in their yards by Ku Klux Klan members. To most Americans, the saga of Jackie Robinson not only brought to light the injustices of discrimination, but reaffirmed the openness of American society.

Rickey and Robinson, however, did not simply end baseball segregation. In 1944, sociologist Gunnar Myrdal viewed the indifference of northern whites as the greatest obstacle to race progress. Robinson's contributions were greater than anything we have seen before, because they focused the prejudices and inequities of the American system openly on one individual, rather than a group, which was an influence tactic similar to the study of "The Jigsaw Classroom" by Dr. Elliot Aronson. Sports writer Leonard Koppett said it perfectly, "The consequences of the waves his appearance made spread far beyond baseball, far beyond sports, far beyond politics, even to the very substance of a culture." (Jules, 1997, p.432) As Lerone Bennett put it so eloquently, "Integration has never been tried in this country. It has not even been defined." (Jules, 1997 p.36) Now, with Jackie Robinson it has been defined and proven to be unjust. But for millions of Americans the experiment launched by Branch Rickey and Jackie Robinson not only defined integration but created an allegory for the nation's future.



Figure 1. Lobby card for *The Jackie Robinson Story* in a scene where Mr. Branch Rickey interviews Jackie Robinson before announcing him as a member of the Brooklyn Dodgers (From Library of Congress, 1950)



Figure 2. Robinson as a second lieutenant in 1943 (From Gary Bedingfield, 2007)

What this case study proves is that African-Americans were not racially inferior, had the intelligence to make sound decisions, and had athletic ability to play the game on the biggest stage. Another quote that embodied Rickey and Robinson's cause of integration is by Alexander Pope, "first endure," but "then embrace". (Jules, 1997, p. 678) The case study of Jackie Robinson, and how Branch Rickey embraced this quote to help desegregate baseball, could be a model for the military to learn the best methods for integrating homosexuals into military ranks.

### **1. History of African-American Soldiers Prior to World War II**

What many people did not know is that Jackie Robinson served in the Army as an officer prior to joining baseball in World War II. As was the case with a lot of African-American soldiers at that time, the military was segregated with most African-Americans put into all-black units. The main reason for segregation was there was an increasing lack of confidence in African-American abilities in combat, a distrust which was held and implanted by influential sections of the larger society. In historical perspectives, African-Americans in our nation's previous conflicts fared no better as discriminations goes. During the Revolutionary War, General George Washington used blacks sparingly; only several thousand were used; and they were scattered as individuals through the ranks. Military personnel needs demanded that many colonies recruit blacks, despite the fear that armed black soldiers might turn against their white counterparts, which would create disharmony among troops, and might drive away more valued white men. (Foner, 1974) In the Civil War, Union commanders grappled with this problem for two years before the decision was made to admit blacks into the ranks. It was not until there were too few white recruits and too many white casualties, that enlisting African-Americans was more tolerable to congressional leaders and Union citizens. (Herek, Jobe, Carney, Ralph, 1996 p. 87)

The ratio of whites to freed blacks during the Revolutionary War was 8:2, but only several thousand blacks served in the military at various positions. The numbers for the Civil War were much more improved over those of the Revolutionary War, 178,985

African-Americans were utilized in the Union Army. By 1866, there were six African-American regiments created to present a friendly and progressive stance toward peace in the Union. African-American soldiers continued to fight in the U.S. wars through World War I, where they displayed valor and bravery on the battlefield. However, the policy of segregating African-American soldiers was still in place even then. Because of widespread beliefs that African-Americans were inferior to whites, society supported restrictions on the recruitment and assignment of African-American military personnel. The issue of inferiority towards African-Americans comes from a social/educational foundation in society, not the biological belief that African-Americans were inferior to Whites. The ones who were recruited most likely ended up in staff positions, such as teaching and payroll administration, or servants rather than infantryman. To ensure its policy on segregation, the armed forces increased the use of standardized intelligence testing during and after World War I. This further reinforced racial discrimination, since military officials often interpreted racial disparities in the test results as authoritative evidence that most Blacks could not master complex military tasks. (Mershon, Schlossman, 1998, p. 1)



Figure 3. Two African-American soldiers that won the Croix de Guerre from France during World War I. (From National Archives, 1947)

Discriminatory immigration policies the same as racial policies against African-Americans/homosexuals in America aimed at southern and eastern Europeans figured into the quota-based policies of the 1920s. With the passage of the Immigration Act of

1924, also known as the National Origins Act or Johnson-Reed Act, the U.S. used restrictive immigration policies in the 1920s based on the 1890 proportions of foreign-born European nationalities. Since the 1890 census reflected higher numbers of northern Europeans, immigrants from those countries had greater opportunities to emigrate. The arguments, outlined in Madison Grant's 1916 book *The Passing of a Great Race*, held that older immigrants were skilled, thrifty, hardworking like native born Americans and recent immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were unskilled, ignorant, predominantly Catholic or Jewish and not easily assimilated into American culture.

During World War I, the southern Europeans in the U.S. Army did much worse than the northern Europeans who were mostly poor immigrants that did not have a proper educational background. Psychologists used during that time set out to study racial differences in intelligence have found that none have existed; many long and thorough studies of this kind have been made. (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998 p. 13) The differences turned out to be based on the educational advantages of the particular group that were given the test. To justify discriminatory policies, military officers and civilian administrators asserted that modern science had demonstrated the existence of profound biological and psychological differences between blacks and whites. They insisted that requiring members of both racial groups to work together would create intolerable levels of hostility and disorder. Leading military and civilian policymakers confidently asserted that the United States was a superior social and political order, created and controlled by whites to serve as a model for and leader of predominantly nonwhite nations. For the military, this definition of national identity had clear implications: The military represented America and the only way to exemplify and safeguard white American civilization was to only have white American soldiers and sailors. The diversity of the existing enlisted force, which included not only African-Americans but also sailors and soldiers from numerous other ethnic backgrounds—many of whom were not even American citizens—had no place in this vision. In the late 1930s, any Army or Navy officer pressed to defend military racial policies could tell you from personal experience, official analyses of recent military history, scientific justification, and the judgments of

prominent colleagues, that there was a clear provision of ample justification for racial discrimination. (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998, p.13) One argument was one of ontology, which stated that blacks lacked the necessary DNA or certain inherent, immutable, defining characteristics, as the reason they were inferior to whites, and was the reason that Blacks would never be good soldiers or sailors. All of these stereotypes accorded with the “scientific racism”, and were the United States social norm between the 1880s and 1930s.

Most of white society viewed the African-Americans and other minority group’s inferiority analogous to Darwin’s biological and empirical social observations, which had no factual evidence to prove these claims. Further, they invoked the legal principle of “separate but equal,” which held that segregation was not inherently a form of discrimination. This exemplified a broad late-nineteenth-century pattern, also evident in other institutions such as schools, hospitals, and transportation facilities, in which blacks gained an expanded share of public benefits but had to accept segregation in order to do so. (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998, p.3) Many in the African-American community believed that somehow supporting the “separate but equal” laws would help make the communities stronger in being isolated from white society, which later proved to be the incorrect analysis. Isolating a group does not solve the issues of prejudice and racism in the society, groups have to square off and face it head-on to change perception of out-groups, and this cannot be done by staying to oneself and keeping away from the other group (an example of Dr. Aronson’s Jigsaw classroom.) In addition to general arguments, military officials voiced concerns that were specific to the military and that incorporated their own particular definitions of professional autonomy and expertise. Racial problems, in their view, were the responsibility of civilian society, not of the military; the armed forces could violate civilian norms of race relations without alienating public support. Unfavorable evaluations of African-American troop performance in World War I had also convinced many officers that African-Americans were generally incompetent in battle and that the use of African-Americans troops tended to undermine the military’s core mission of maintaining combat effectiveness. By the early Twentieth



Century, discrimination against African-American soldiers sharply limited the development of military leadership skills and career aspirations among African-Americans.

These judgments, while often resting upon dubious evidence and questionable inferences, carried great weight with policymakers at the outset of World War II. They functioned as powerful arguments against proposals for reforming military racial policies.

## **2. African-American Soldiers During World War II**

The policy on African-Americans segregation in the military during the onset of World War II was allowed to drift by the military decision makers. The prevalence of a racial perspective among African-American troops in World War II is shown in the “studies” made by the Research Branch studies. (Mandelbaum, 1952, p.94) One outcome of the racial perspective was that the African-Americans, on the average, tended to show less enthusiasm for the war than did whites, and did not want to go to war. African-Americans, in general, were fighting two wars: one on discrimination by whites at home, and the other overseas against Hitler. This stigma of African-Americans being inferior to whites established African-Americans as an out-group.

An out-group (African-Americans), which is stigmatized as inferior, and does not accept this judgment, lowers its output and does other things to antagonize the in-group (whites) which considers itself superior. Although this makes the in-group upset, the out-group can revel in the satisfaction of getting back at the in-group for thinking they are inferior. This further stimulates the antagonism between groups. Segregation did nothing to help the African-Americans’ cause to eliminate the whites’ assumptions of them, it just improved it. Sociologist, Arnold M. Rose viewed how segregation impacted the African-Americans of the Army’s Second Cavalry Division. He states that the African-Americans were given inadequate training and equipment to fight as soldiers, this, coupled with the leadership of substandard white officers made for an impossible environment to gain any type of knowledge or skill. As a quote from an African-

American sergeant says, “We spend too much time hating and fighting our officers to have any energy left for the Germans.” (Mandelbaum, 1952, p.98)



Figure 4. A platoon of Negro troops surrounds a farm house in a town in France, as they prepare to eliminate a German sniper holding up an advance. Omaha Beachhead, near Vierville-sur-Mer, France. (From Todd, 1944)

Most African-Americans were accustomed to the pattern of segregation as civilians and had feared the consequences of what would happen if segregation was abolished in the military. Segregation was set up for failure (i.e., education, training, materials, and leadership) to the African-Americans units during World War II, but the outcome was different for formation of Nisei units. Nisei units were made-up of Japanese-Americans who were specially selected to fight during the war. Most Nisei felt they had something to prove to white Americans, because of the Empire of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. They wanted to prove that they were countrymen and good soldiers and Americans.

The framing of segregation proved of a different sort to the African-American soldier, who experienced the same societal pattern of hate as in the civilian side. The Nisei, just as the African-American soldiers in the Civil War, thought that segregation was a test by white society as a way to show that they were not second-class citizens, but in fact equals. The African-American soldiers of World War II faced a different outlook

on segregation; they felt that segregation was not a test to challenge their abilities, but a test to demonstrate that they were in fact second-class citizens by the white society. African-Americans were framed as not having the same attitudes and behavior patterns as Whites, however, the Research Branch study proved this not to be true. The study showed that African-Americans had the same cultural similarities as those in white society, as far as having the same beliefs and ideas of the quality of life for their families.

The actual intellectual level of African-Americans soldiers abilities in combat in fact the opposite of conventional beliefs. It was believed that they were not intelligent enough to perform certain duties in the military, but in fact they were far more intelligent than some Whites at the same grade level. Segregation could not rationally be justified on the grounds that African-Americans could not satisfactory perform skilled tasks. The Research Branch study made the case known that the relationship between the black and white infantrymen was better than what the military decision makers were stating.

In 1944, the War Department issued a pamphlet on the Command of Negro Troops stating that, "It is important to understand that separate organization is a matter of practical military expediency. A 1943 survey of the attitudes of white and colored soldiers indicates that the odds are very much in favor of less interracial friction if the colored and white enlisted men continue to be organized in separate racial units." (Mandelbaum, 1952, p.105) The Navy's policy on integration is as follows:

The navy had defended the non-utilization of Negroes in general service by citing the lower of Negro skills and by appealing to the necessity of maintaining ship efficiency and ship morale. It had discovered that, as individuals, Negroes could be trained and utilized in as wide a range of skills as Whites, and that failure to use them as individuals resulted in a waste of manpower which neither the Navy nor the country could afford. Still driven by the imperative need for skilled men, the Navy had put Negro ratings aboard ship and found that no trouble resulted. In defense of its new policy the Navy now cites the skills of its Negro manpower and ship efficiency. (Mandelbaum, 1952, p.142)

Similarly, the Air Force took the same path as the Army and Navy integration policy with this memorandum by William H. Hastie:

That segregation had to be maintained because of social custom and because of the possibility of difficulties between Negro and white airmen if they were placed in the same unit. In the latter recommendations the staff officers were dealing with social rather than purely military matters. As it turned out, they were wrong in their judgments of the social situation as they were right in their appraisal of the military situation which maintained that there should be no race distinction made on the Air Force job. Many more Negroes than the commanders had expected had demonstrated a capacity to compete on an equal basis, to absorb technical training successfully, and to perform ably in technical assignments. (Mandelbaum, 1952, p.142)

Where segregation had been abolished, under carefully planned conditions, the military as a whole benefited greatly by increased manpower efficiency and decreased racial conflicts. In the areas where segregation was still presented, complaints of discrimination continued to be a problem that made interracial cohesion in the units almost impossible. The year of 1944 made great strides to abolish the segregation policies of African-Americans, but it was not until after World War II that the policies started to come to fruition.

### **3. African-American Soldiers after World War II**

#### **a. Desegregation in the Navy**

For African-Americans, desegregation was far from being merely an impractical dream or an abstract moral consideration, in society, it was found to be an organizational necessity. A report on race relations in the Navy done by Lester B. Granger on the behest of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, found that racial tensions only arise when there is an attempt on ships to separate African-American crews from whites. Even more alarming was that the racial tension on the ships was less than the shore side facilities. Although “desegregation” was obviously effective on ships, the Navy still chose to segregate ashore. The decision to maintain this seemingly bipolar attitude towards African-Americans nested squarely on the shoulders of the Navies senior officers. In all the studies on integration, leadership is always the key factor in the process. The Navy’s top brass of Admirals Ernest J. King and Chester W. Nimitz

supported full desegregation in the Navy. This was a time when the Jim Crow laws and institutionalized racial discrimination were still the norm in civilian society. By all accounts, it seemed to be a major step in policy shift changes in the Navy, but the process was later not forcefully implemented, thus the tradition of segregation was maintained for African-Americans. Next, the program that did the study (Special Programs Unit) was abolished in 1946, and now there was no unit to monitor or study race relations in the Navy.



Figure 5. "Above and Beyond the Call of Duty." Color poster of Doris (Dorie) Miller by David Stone Martin. Poster dated 1943. From the National Archives and Records Administration collection, photograph

#### **b. Desegregation in the Army**

The Army had a different take on desegregation for African-Americans. The Army made a stance that it would not allow desegregation to take place during the postwar era. (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998, p.15) The Army used a study conducted by the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division, between May and June 1945 to see if their policy on race relations was sound. It concluded that of the 250 white officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO), sixty-four percent stated that they initially had some doubt or worries about the mixing of platoons, but changed their minds after

serving with African-Americans in mixed units. Eighty one percent stated that the African-Americans fought very well in combat. Eighty six percent of the white officers and 92 percent of the NCOs, made the startling analysis that if the African-Americans were given the same training as whites, they could perform on the same level or even better than their white counterparts. The only racial tension seen in Army combat was at Garrison Duty, but 62 percent white officers and 89 percent of NCOs concluded that the Army should proceed to mix white and African-American soldiers into units in the future from then on. The research showed that the white and African-American soldiers also fared well in race relations in those units that had the heaviest combat. Maybe, this is because life and death situations can bring different cultures together when faced with the uncertainty of death on the horizon in combat situations (another example of Dr. Aronson's Jigsaw classroom.) The evidence from this survey made the case for full desegregation of the Army, but drew controversy and consternation from the Army brass due to the fact that the findings went against what they wanted the study to prove as far race relations were concerned. Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis Sr. (the first African-American general) and the commander of the Information and Education Division, Major General F.H. Osborn, tried to fight for the survey results to go public on their findings, but had stiff opposition from the Army upper echelon, in particular, General Brehon S. Somervell, the commander of the Army Service Forces. (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998 p. 143)



Figure 6. Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis watches a Signal Corps crew erecting poles, somewhere in France. (From Cunningham, 1944)

Somervell felt that if the survey were made public, then they would have organizations like the NAACP and other civil-rights advocates trying to undermine the Army by pushing for racially mixed units during the war. He concluded that this would only complicate the more pressing matters of winning the war by defeating Germany and Japan. At the same time, the survey could have made conservative members in Congress agitated, as well as others who would have a say about shaping the world after the war. In the end, Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, decided that the Research Branch's findings should not be made public. (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998, p. 143) The survey was not published, and discussion of it gradually went away in the dusk within the Army—but not before it became one ingredient in the formulation of a new Army policy statement on race relations in 1946.

**c. Impact of Executive Order 9981 (July 26, 1948)**

When President Harry S. Truman enacted his executive order against racial discrimination, he did not know what the impact would be or the backlash that would ensue. He initially thought it would help to cement a coalition of African-Americans and liberal-to-moderate whites, which would be the crucial piece needed for him to win reelection in November 1948, by offsetting the losses from the southern states

who were in-favor of segregation. Many historians felt that Truman did not want to end discrimination, because he had no particular personal commitments to the African-Americans community, and this was purely only politically motivated for another term. Less than eight years separated Truman's order from the September 1940 meeting at which President Roosevelt and senior civilian and military officials had rejected the idea of desegregation. (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998, p. 158)

The societal norms were changing due to the ending of World War II and a new sense of interracial unity and emergence of African-American activism which influenced the presidential elections. With the Cold War on the horizon, Americans felt that racial discrimination would affect our stance to the world as a superpower and our national security from communist. Evidence later proved that desegregation was a legitimate avenue, with Jackie Robinson breaking down the color barrier in major league baseball. The Executive Order 9981 was issued on 26 July, just two weeks after the Democratic convention, which was perfect for Truman. Truman addressed the Congress one day later stating he wanted to make good on the promise he made that past February to, "protect and extend basic civil rights of citizenship and human liberty." (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998, p. 183) The order was not fully detailed in its entirety and only called for equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services, but said nothing about ending the Jim Crow laws or segregation in the military. The order was quickly implemented, maybe to keep conservatives in Washington from trying to reject the new policy. The apparent vagueness of the order, which did not specify what should be done and when, caused some perplexity. Many people noted that the text contained nothing that explicitly required the abolition of racial segregation in the military. Conceivably, the stated objective of "equal treatment and opportunity" could be met by strict adherence to the provision of separate but equal facilities, based on the familiar legal argument that segregation was not discrimination. Neither did the order establish any timeline for action or criteria—other than maintaining military efficiency—for defining successful implementation. Whether it actually amounted to a substantive framing policy change seemed, on the surface, open to question. There were people in



the administration who thought that the policy did not prescribe a particular guideline to follow so that each individual service could choose how they follow the policy. This is one of Dr. Pratkanis' rules for ending discrimination, you have to "Identify and Remove Institutional Barriers" for desegregation to work. Truman's order only ended segregation in the armed services but not discrimination in society. For the policy to work effectively, you must remove the institutional barriers that are put in place if you want to have any cohesion within the military, not by cleaning up policies to win votes. In the end Truman got what he wanted and the black community in small part moved a step closer to racial equality...even if it was a very small step.

#### **d. Summary**

The in-group is so important to an African-American, because it is the only face-to-face group to which the soldier can belong, and he has an even stronger need to belong to such a group as soldier than he did as a civilian. This group is of such great importance to an African-American, because of the uniqueness of his experience within the unit, and because of the high degree of mutual dependence and responsibility given to him in the in-group. That is why this helps the African-American soldier by reducing his anxiety, and make him feel that he counts as a person in this world as a human being and not just a second-class citizen, with no place in the country to call his own, thus enabling him to withstand the strains of military life, which he might not otherwise be able to tolerate. Once an African-American was placed in an integrated unit however, he generally became part of the informal group—where he needs to be sociable or liked to be accepted in the in-group. For African-Americans acceptance has always been a problem, because one of the reasons always leads back to the issue of color.

Color has always been the dividing line to make African-Americans feel less worthy of a legitimate social identity than Euro-Americans and less favored over those with lighter skin within their own race. Consequently, this color line between light and dark complexioned African-Americans has caused division, schism, and contention among themselves that still exists today. Many African Americans have accepted the ideology of the white racial frame that lighter skin tones and straight hair makes one

more acceptable to dominant in-group members. The general consensus is that the color line division among African-Americans has caused self-hatred between those with lighter skin and those with a darker hue. In integrated combat units, however, the color of one's skin does not have any effect on a white unit member's likes or dislikes for that particular African-American based on skin tone. Among whites, color makes little difference, except where they defend others on that score against outsiders. Friction between individuals or groups, because of race, usually decreases when integration replaces segregation. "This is so, partly because the African-American's racial perspective, which sees discrimination at every hand, diminishes in an integrated unit; and partly because the white comrades of an African-American soldier are less likely to foment racial hostilities." (Mandelbaum, 1952, p.132) In combat, all factors which make the in-group so important are intensified, and it becomes of crucial importance. The forces which actuate the soldier for long periods while he is in combat are significantly those which rise out of his in-group affiliation. In the behavior of African-American units, the concept of the in-group may be used to explain the particular reasons for integration. As we have seen in this study of historical evidence on the subject, it shows that integration has yielded results which were satisfactory from the standpoint of military performance, but segregation—in recent years at least—has been unsatisfactory by the same criterion. Most of the military commanders tended impartially to have needless misgivings about the use of African-American troops in the military in combat situations or specific duties, as in the example of the Navy's case, "desegregation" of the fleets worked exceptionally well. Only when their hand was forced did the powers that be let the African-Americans fight alongside White troops. Like General George Washington, who on the advice of his staff and of a civilian committee, ordered that the Blacks who, were then in the Continental Army at the time, were to be excluded from it, and further recruiting of Blacks was to be stopped, but when this order was rescinded because of the threat of enemy propaganda to Blacks and for other reasons beyond Washington's control, let the Blacks continue to serve usefully and creditably in the military. During the Civil War, the Union Army only allowed African-American soldiers fight because the Confederates

were using African-Americans to fight against them and to help restock there depleted ranks that suffer heavy losses. By the time World War II rolled around, the question was not whether to use African-Americans in the war, but should they serve in the armed forces, and how should they utilize them. White officers in combat units preferred a more mixed company of soldiers than the all-White and all-African-American units.

Despite staff studies which recommended either integration or a small all-African-American unit in white divisions, in the end three all-African-American divisions were activated, because a mixed-company organization was not attempted due to the fear that such companies (of one African-American platoon in a company) would not work in combat. Thus this theory did not work and the three divisional all-African-American groups were far from effective, in part to lack of proper training, supplies, and leadership from the military, but when mixed companies were established because of great need for infantrymen, it seemed to bode well for the military. The Navy and Air Force excluded African-Americans from general service for some years until it had to take them from Selective Service during World War II, only when pressure was applied to the organizations of change is what led Navy and Air Force to experiment cautiously with integration. When the experiments proved to be a success, is when they quickly abolished segregation and allowed full integration into their organization.

Segregation in the military is not only unnecessarily inefficient in the use of manpower, but a waste of material and facilities, that affects the cohesion of the primary group when its members are under stress. While there have been and now are excellent blacks in the military, these men accomplished great feats and served with great honor, despite the hindrances imposed by segregation. Segregation encourages a racial perspective so that men tend to interpret everything unpleasant which happens to them in terms of racial discrimination. (Mandelbaum, 1952, p.130) As seen in the study, the segregated units' leadership was less effective than in non-segregated outfits also, the complaints tended to be more frequent and bitter, efficiency is frequently below the full potential, and morale is often very low. Segregation is a continuous reminder to the men that a low opinion of their African-American fellows is held by parts of the larger society.

(Mandelbaum, 1952, p.131) Integration has worked well because under conditions of military service that forced certain social norms to be challenged and changed to make the African-American soldier a part of the primary group are powerful enough to override any negative racial attitudes. When it is made routine procedure, white men and black men do not oppose integration because it now standard organizational policy.

By the end of World War II, more than one million African-Americans served effectively in various service branches. (Foner, 1974) There were no reports of racial violence or noncooperation in combat zones, although reports circulated of tension over use of recreation facilities in rear areas. (Lee, 1966) Overall, events in World War II demonstrated that African-American soldiers were effective fighters and that “mixing of the races” would not compromise unit effectiveness. (Stouffer et al., 1949) The Stouffer et al. study of unit effectiveness may have been the first social science study that contributed directly to a change in social policy. The paradoxical shift of military racial policies ushered in a new era of societal norms. The military policies of overt, mandatory racial exclusion and segregation disappeared and were replaced by formal racial integration and ostensibly race-neutral personnel policies. The long, convoluted, and ultimately successful process of desegregating the armed forces resulted from complex interactions between concerns specific to the military and the broader politics of race and civil rights between 1940s and 1960s. In the book “Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces”, the author points out four particular areas that were the reasons why the military changed its racial policies of discrimination: 1. The changes were done as political leverage. 2. Leadership was essential to the extent and range of military race relations. 3. Military evaluations of African-American soldiers made an indubitable effect on military policy decision makers. 4. Race reform importantly changed the military behavior toward segregation. Thus an organization that often proclaimed racial discrimination to be indispensable to American military strength and that disavowed involvement in controversial social issues nonetheless found itself in the vanguard of fundamental change in American race relations; making the foundation

for the stepping stones of policies that will in the future help with the integration of women/homosexuals become a reality.

**e. African-American Soldiers from the Korean to Vietnam War**

In 1951, the military hired social scientists from John Hopkins University to study the impact of desegregation on unit effectiveness of troops deployed in Korea. (Operations Research Office, 1954) The study, known as Project Clear; found that racial integration had no significant effect on task performance or unit effectiveness. (Bogart, 1992) In fact, 89 percent of officers assigned to integrated units reported that the level of cooperation among these units was equal or superior to that of white units. Moreover, white soldiers who had greater experience with African-Americans were more accepting of integration. Project Clear findings provided additional support for full integration and, by the end of the Korean conflict; the Department of Defense (DoD) had eliminated all racially segregated units and living quarters. (MacGregor, 1981) The Korean War was the first time since the Revolutionary War that African-Americans and whites fought in formally mixed integrated units. Integration became the standard and the leaders saw no difference between the fighting abilities of African-American and white soldiers. As stated earlier in the study, integrated units fought better than the segregated units. Where segregation had been abolished, under carefully planned conditions, the Army has benefited by increased manpower efficiency and decreased racial conflict. Where segregation has been retained, complaints of discrimination continued to well up and interracial hostility sporadically broke out. There was two phases of integration during this time. The first was organizational and the second leadership integration. The organizational portion of integration ended all forms of discrimination in recruitment, training, retention, and on-base living arrangements. The second phase, leadership integration, did not happen for another quarter century, in part due to Truman's Executive Order 9981. By the mid-1950s, you could see African-American soldiers marching down the street in integrated units at a time when African-Americans were still arguing for their educational rights before the Supreme Court and marching for their social and political rights in the Jim Crow South; the military had become desegregated almost clandestinely.

Integration went so smoothly partly because it affected only the enlisted men, and enlisted men of every race had always been treated, as the saying went, “like Negroes.” There were few African-Americans officers in the military during the 1950s and even the 1960s, so integration required only minor adjustments on the part of the command structure. Racial discrimination was not abolished by edict, however. Prejudice and traditional antiracial practices continued even though African-Americans and Whites were now living and working together. In the late 1960s, African-Americans were more likely than Whites to be drafted, serve in high-risk combat units, and be wounded or killed (Badillo and Curry, 1976). An investigation by the Defense Race Relation Institute (DRRI)/ Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)’s found confrontational and experiential techniques to be overzealous, and later programs were modified to focus less on attitude change and more on awareness of personal prejudicial attitudes and compliance with equal opportunity directives. Another issue was the lack of African-American officers that needed to be addressed, but has not even in today’s military.

## **B. SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE**

On the sociological bases, white soldiers and sailors in general were in favor of racial segregation and other forms of discrimination in America. Military officials in the 1920s and 1930s maintained that given the strength of the emotions that surrounded the long-established pattern of white dominance and black subordination, it would be disastrous for the armed forces to pursue any policy other than strict segregation of the races. The prospect of bringing whites and blacks together in close quarters in the armed forces, or creating situations in which blacks might have to give orders to whites, was simply not tenable. Proponents of the sociological argument held that even if blacks and whites were both equally capable of performing the same military tasks, black personnel and white personnel should continue to be grouped in separate units in order to prevent disharmony. In addition to safeguarding the internal harmony of military organizations, military officials also frequently expressed a concern about preserving the public

legitimacy of the armed forces, where most of the social norms of discrimination originated. A strict adherence to social norms and refusal to serve as a “sociological laboratory” reflected a widely accepted view of the proper relationship between the military and American society. What transpired was a belief by military officers and civilians that they should not try to solve each other’s problems, in turn, should not intervene in or second-guess the professional decisions of military personnel about how to implement national defense policies. Any controversial change in the status of blacks within the military would undoubtedly undermine the civil-military relationship which, in essence, force the armed forces into an emotionally charged politics of racial issues and thus cause the public to lose confidence in the judgment of military officials.

### **C. LESSONS LEARNED FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND HOMOSEXUAL INTEGRATION INTO THE MILITARY**

Segregation of African-Americans was based on factors (skin color and the discomfort of whites) that were not directly related to the capacity of African-Americans to perform their job. We would argue that the exclusion of gay men and lesbians is also based on factors unrelated to job performance. (McDaniel, 1989) The core reality is that African-Americans more so than homosexuals, have a dual sense of identity and grievance with America, one that is unique and far stronger than any other ethnic group’s sense of belonging or not belonging. The confluence of race, slavery, and segregation has created a social reality that in the American experience is unparalleled. (Perhaps the Native American story comes closest.)

The integration of a social out-group can occur in a hostile military environment even without public support if the right leadership and policies are in place. The intense cooperation required to meet military goals has a democratizing effect in the military. Gordon W. Allport’s long-standing and hard-wearing “equal contact” statement four decades ago remains a classic:

Prejudice...may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly

enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports...and provided it is of the sort that leads to perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups.

Although some branches were more supportive of integration than others and integration had made some gains before Truman's order in 1948, support from military leaders was not uniform and the opposition was strong. But military commanders in support of integration were essential to creating an atmosphere of equitable treatment. It is also noteworthy that the military was integrated even before the country initially experienced desegregation. Moreover, public opinion polls showed the country was more opposed to racial integration than it is to homosexuals in the military. A powerful incentive for racial integration in the military was the costliness and inefficiency of maintaining segregated units. Although personnel demands during times of combat facilitated movement toward integration, peacetime often brought renewed social restrictions. It seems unlikely that integration would have occurred on its civil rights merits alone. Likewise, advocates of a homosexual-tolerant policy may win more supporters by focusing on the economic and personnel costs of excluding gay men and lesbians, rather than on an issue of civil rights. Rapid integration of social out-group during the Korean War resulted in few problems, perhaps because of the shared goal of fighting a common enemy and the change in societal norms towards African-Americans after World War II. Despite predictions about the loss of morale, order and discipline, racial integration did not reduce the effectiveness of the armed forces.

Even in a time of great racial strife such as the late 1960s, combat soldiers in Vietnam who shared a goal of survival could work together effectively despite ethnic differences. Common task-related or subordinate goals, personal contact, and equal status may be more important to unit effectiveness than racial or sexual orientation similarity among group members. (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1976; National Defense Research Institute, 1993) That homosexual people have been and are in the military at various levels could facilitate tolerance of homosexuals, if the environment supports tolerance as a goal. The military institution is resilient. It has adapted to dramatic



reorganization in the past fifty years, including racial integration, gender integration, and a switch to an all-volunteer force. In light of these changes, it seems unlikely that the military could not adapt to openly homosexual personnel among its ranks. Indeed, homosexual people have served and continue to serve honorably in the military—some serving secretly and others not so secretly. (Shilts, 1993) Policy change does not eliminate prejudicial attitudes or practices. Equal opportunity training may facilitate civility and good working relationships, but may have little effect on personnel prejudices. Even so, equal treatment will not immediately result in greater minority representation at high levels.

Like African-Americans, openly homosexual recruits will require several years to advance through the ranks. The perception of efforts toward improvement of equal opportunity conditions may be more important to retention of minorities in the military than elimination of discrimination. It is unclear at present what components of training are most effective in accomplishing this perception. But one important factor in creating an impression of equal treatment is the monitoring and enforcement of anti-discriminatory practices. Formal efforts to prohibit racist expressions can be a way of avoiding a genuine opening up of channels for African-America advancement, but this realization does not imply that any retreat from antidiscrimination should be made. Racist behavior cannot be tolerated within the leadership of an organization at any level. Individuals who display racist tendencies must not be promoted to positions of responsibility. In the military, racist behavior must at all costs end a person's career with no exceptions to the rule. Racial remarks should never be heard from any military personnel regardless of rank this will help to break the social norm and reflect the new policy is adhered to. Whether it is formal or informal, promotion criteria must include sensitivity on racial matters.

In part, racial tensions were exacerbated in the 1960s by policies that were not enforced. Initially, equal opportunity training by DEOMI took a bottom-up approach. Coincidentally, those (White officers) at the top who were charged with implementing policy may have been less sensitized to discriminatory practices than African-Americans

and enlisted personnel. Recognizing that top-down interventions targeting those in command may be necessary, Secretary of Defense William Perry ordered DEOMI in 1994 to train all newly selected admirals, general officers, and senior executive personnel. National leadership is crucial to effective implementation of out-group integration.

Once President Truman had formulated a strong position on racial integration, the tradition of military compliance to civilian authority led to efforts to produce change. A movement toward racial integration in the military was growing before Truman's action, however, and commanders who favored integration played a vital role in implementing the new policy. Implementing a policy tolerant to gays will likely require strong civilian authority from the president or the Supreme Court, as well as strong military leadership. Religious opposition to social integration was deflected by a focus on civility rather than changing personal beliefs. Traditionally, the military has drawn many of its members from areas in the country where conservative denominations are most prevalent. These same regions were most opposed to racial integration of the military fifty years ago. A similar focus on working relationships rather than acceptance of homosexuals may be similarly effective in handling religious opposition.

The final lesson of the military experience is political. A society no longer united by foreign threats may discover that its own internal racial divisions are deeper and more intractable than anyone realized as was the case of World War II. The growing centrifugal tensions in America could easily make national unity the issue of the Twenty-First Century. The military of the 1970s recognized that its race problem was so critical that it was on the verge of self-destruction. That realization set in motion the steps that have led to today's relatively positive state of affairs. The Landis survey (1990) also found that African-Americans and Whites viewed racial segregation as less desirable than they had more than a decade ago, and African-Americans described the military's equal opportunity efforts as "good" to "very good." (Herek, Jobe, Carney, Ralph 1996 p. 91) One may argue that changes in the military's racial climate were inevitable as in case "Jackie Robinson" study. One reason for greater minority retention could be that people

from lower socioeconomic groups are waiting out a less-promising civilian economy (any correlation to today's economic situation, I wonder) Few would argue that the history of discrimination against African-Americans in the United States is the same as treatment of homosexuals, but the next chapter of this study will show that the differences are not as similar as we may think.

#### **D. DIFFERENCES IN AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND HOMOSEXUALS**

The comparison of African-American and homosexual experiences is not perfect. The similarities of the social situations presented by the two cases, however, warrant the study of the African-American experience as it may apply to current social phenomena associated with the repeal of DADT. The study of the African-American experience in Major League baseball and the U.S. military may help the military avoid the painful and inefficient, if not ineffective, integration of homosexuals into the fighting forces of the United States. Homosexuals are not as identifiable as African-Americans, which in some ways make them more threatening to heterosexuals. In this, what may be called an in-group heterosexual society, the stereotypes of homosexual's appearance and behavior are limited in utility. A second difference between African-Americans and homosexuals is that the African-Americans reside in the inner cities of this country or what is consider the lower socioeconomic class and have borne the stigma associated with being poor or a under societal class of people. Thus, racism in the United States was linked with social class of ethnicity, and class polarization may have aided recognition of biased social practices. Homosexuals do not represent a category of social class and may be found across all social strata, including ethnicity. It is much more difficult to argue that a "class" is disadvantaged when you cannot recognize who is and who is not homosexual unless told by the person themselves, but they still will not t be as disadvantaged as the African-American race to this day.

The last distinction is related to the second. Whereas skin color is a dominant genetic characteristic and family members generally look similar, homosexuality, if hereditary, is not dominant because most family members are heterosexual. Most

African-Americans have African-American parents, African-American family members, and an African-American social community will be recognized as African-American. Regardless, out-groups share the same hurt and pain of discrimination which is sometimes looked at as a source of strength, but more so, it provides an understanding of the past and helps in understanding what they went through was not in vain. Homosexuals come from different backgrounds or denominations, rather than being raised into a community like African-Americans, and must find each other to experience the strength and safety of community. The caveat to this, is a homosexual person is more likely to be vulnerable to discrimination due to not having that strong community support of other homosexuals. From the differences between the experiences of African-Americans and homosexuals, many advocates of military policy change can know where they need to focus further attention. From the similarities between African-Americans and homosexuals, the history of racial integration in the military can provide several lessons that could facilitate implementation of a more homosexual-tolerant policy. Yet, lessons from integration should not be taken to mean that acceptance of openly homosexuals personnel in the military may be easy, painless, or peaceful.

#### **E. FOREIGN MILITARIES INTEGRATION OF HOMOSEXUAL POLICY**

Two general patterns emerged during this study on how foreign countries have dealt with the issues of homosexuals in their military forces. One involves the policies and practices of the military itself. A temporal difference may arise between the policies of military accession and the conditions of subsequent service. For example, there may be no restrictions on homosexuals entering the military but heavy sanctions on behavior while in the service. As Table 1 shows, the U.S. has the highest ratio of rejection for homosexuality being accepted in the military than the other major democracies such as the counterparts in Europe. In addition, the conditions of subsequent service may vary, depending on whether the soldier is a conscript or a volunteer.

The second pattern shows a distinct clear relationship between the country's policy on sexual orientation and other areas of integration such as race, ethnicity, or

gender. Examples include Canada and the Netherlands in particular where sexual orientation integration has been seen explicitly as a civil rights or human rights issue. Most nations do not categorically exclude homosexuals. Some of those that in the past have excluded homosexuals have changed their policies in recent years. There appears to be no evidence of any nation that in the past has admitted homosexuals and has recently moved to exclude them. Thus, the number of nations that exclude homosexuals from military service has been declining. Canada had much of the same issues as the U.S. did in the debate to lift its homosexuals in the military policy; which was unit cohesion and morale in the units. Also, the performance of the forces was another issue to integration policy as well. An interesting fact in Canada case is that most of the testimony given on rectifying homosexuals in the military policy was given by experts from the U.S.

A no-restriction policy began when homosexuals were officially lifted by directives that came straight from the assistant minister for defense and from the chief of the defense staff. As in the case for the U.S., explanations for the policy change were given to the leaders, along with a reminder that they were responsible for implementing the change. The defense leaders also appealed to the sense of fairness of service members to enlist their support for the policy. If servicemen did not feel they could support this policy change, they were given the option of leaving the Canadian Forces. The policy change was interpreted as an equal rights nondiscrimination issue. The disturbing part of how Canada handled this policy was that they made it a deliberate low-key inclusion into the military doctrine, with no special education or training to focus on sexual orientation policy proposed or conducted. Another area of concern was the Canadian government forced strict guidelines on how all heterosexuals and homosexuals interacted, which does not help the integration process, it just makes it worst. As experienced in the integration of African-Americans in the U.S. armed services, groups work better together in mixed groups rather than separately. Canada identified they could not avoid change of the inevitable, but did not fully remove the institutional barriers in the process either. Sexual misconduct and harassment, from whatever source, were not to be tolerated. All the references specifically homosexual conduct were removed from

regulations and guidelines, thus, all the service members were to be treated equally regardless of sexual orientation. No questions were asked of applicants or service members about their sexual orientation, and should orientation become known, it could not be used to restrict promotions, assignments, and so forth, which was an excellent cognition of understanding the truth of how some could use the policy as a way to intimidate or bully homosexuals. Further, Canadian Forces members could not refuse to work or berth with other service members based on their sexual orientation, which was and is an issue today with African-Americans and homosexuals in the military.

Part of the reason for the successful implementation, was the immediate and full support of the policy change by the leaders in the Department of Defense and in the Canadian Forces. This is an example of psychology of the inevitable that made it a leadership responsibility at every level of the Canadian Forces and showed they meant to implement the policy fully. Moreover, special attention was directed away from homosexuals rather than toward them as a special case. They were to be treated like everyone else, not like a protected class. Finally, a poor job market and economy and a need to reduce Canadian Forces personnel may have had a positive impact as well. At any rate, the Canadian case appears to be a successful removal of a ban on homosexual service. The ultimate impact on the Canadian Forces is unknown. The United Kingdom's change to the military policy was different from Canada's, but as our international partner and the country we most emulate, it is important to see how they handle their integration policy.

The United Kingdom is a particularly interesting case because it highlights the direction of social change and reflects a frequently found divergence between official policy and actual practice, which shows a commonly found pattern in society in general: that of limited human tolerance an in-group can take of a particular out-group. Thus, the official policy is one of exclusion. In the United Kingdom supposedly military personnel are not asked about their sexual orientation, unless they call attention to themselves. Unlike the U.S. armed forces, if their sexual orientation becomes known, but are not openly engaged in homosexual behavior, they might be counseled and armed against

misconduct, rather than discharged. The United Kingdom used to discharge the majority of homosexual cases that would appear as administrative, rather than disciplinary. France had a very open policy to homosexuals in the military, which was not uncommon due to how the French conducted themselves as a very libertarian society.

In France homosexuality was not a major issue for the armed forces, according to French officials and researchers. Unless there are behavioral problems, the military regards sexuality as a private matter, and in fact homosexuality per se is not grounds for avoiding conscription, although behavioral problems associated with homosexuality may preclude service. The Italian government did not discriminate against homosexuals, but in practice, however, Italian society is fairly un-accepting of homosexual behavior, considering it to be socially less acceptable than sexual relations between minors. Italians viewed homosexual behavior to be illegal if it results in enticement or prostitution, or if one disguises oneself in public—all of which are illegal regardless of one's sexual orientation. As in the rest of Latin Europe, homosexuality, like other sexual matters, is largely ignored if it is kept a private matter and does not result in scandal. Belgium is close to Latin Europe, but has a different view to homosexuality than its neighbors.

Belgium has a significant Francophone population; like its Latin European neighbors, Belgium holds a *laissez-faire* position. There are no laws, rules, or regulations discriminating against homosexuals in the military, as long as they separate their personal and professional life, which is the same idyllic view as Italy. Indeed, homosexuals have equal employment rights in both the civilian and military arenas. In the case Belgium is more explicitly tolerant than other *laissez-faire* countries and is closer to the dominant Northern European pattern in homosexual equality. Germany on the other hand is more like Great Britain than Belgium as far as its system of policy.

Germany itself manifests a major difference between policy and practice on homosexuals in the military as in the opposite direction on its policy because it lies at one end of the range of patterns. It is also an extremely complex case, because its armed

forces are composed of both conscripts and volunteers, who, as in the Italian case, serve under different policies, and because there are civilian service alternatives to conscription for conscientious objectors. In practice, as reflected in the table, Germany is the most exclusionary country we have studied.

Like most European countries, Germany did not officially regard sexual orientation as a relevant criterion for conscription to military service, and homosexual volunteers could not be inducted, and career personnel who are discovered to be homosexual are limited in the nature of their service. Officially this is not because of homosexuality per se but because of its presumed impact on their aptitude and leadership ability. So, for the most part homosexuals seemed most likely not to join the German military. The interesting concept of German policy was that they, unlike most nations, would ask conscripts and volunteers about their sexual orientation during the accession physical examination, although this is not an official policy. Many homosexual young men chose the civilian life rather than the military service. If they are conscripted then, they would reveal their sexual orientation during the in-process and are likely to be rejected as “mentally unfit for service,” thereby avoiding both military service and alternative civilian service. Official policy states that regular servicemen and volunteers are not rendered unfit by homosexuality, nor can they be discharged for a homosexual orientation, which contradicts what the last sentence states on their handling of homosexuals’ privacy rights. If they are discovered to be homosexual and have served for more than four years, they are not discharged before their term of service is completed. In practice, if their orientation becomes known, homosexuals will not be allowed to assume supervisory positions or serve as instructors. They may be restricted from high-security assignments as well, like African-Americans soldiers during World War II in the U.S. Junior officers on the other hand can be discharged within three years after their commissioning on grounds that they are unfit for a career as an officer, which places a double standard between NCO and officers, which can never happen if you want to make an equal and symmetrical military.






Table 1. Homosexuality Should Be Rejected or Accepted? (Survey Report, November, 2011) (From American Exceptionalism Subsides, 2011)

The Netherlands has perhaps the most tolerant position regarding homosexuals in the military. The survey report shown in Table 1 points out that homosexuality is widely accepted in key European countries as well as the U.S., rather than being rejected by society. As Dutch sociologist Jan van der Meulen reported at a 1991 conference, “The acceptance and integration of women, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals in the armed forces was initiated as principle and policy before the end of the Cold War... This does not mean that women, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals nowadays meet no discrimination any longer, nor that all three integration processes are concurrent.” (Herek, Jobe, Carney, 1996, p.122) They emphasized that sexual orientation has been ruled out as a selection criterion for both conscripts and career personnel, and that when problems do occur it is seen not as a consequence of homosexual orientation, but of homophobic reaction. With the Netherlands it maybe has the most open and tolerant society with regard to homosexuality in the military in Europe, but has been in a position to undertake candid policy initiatives to make integration work, and to conduct research on problems of integration. Because of its belief that such problems are primarily a result of homophobia rather than of a homosexuality per se, the military has instituted a training program to familiarize personnel with the range of homosexual lifestyles and to attempt to dispel incorrect stereotypes. In a major survey in 1991, a very small proportion of

military personnel reported themselves to be homosexuals (about 1 percent of men, 3.5 percent of women). Most heterosexual personnel expressed a tolerance for the rights of homosexuals, but 30 percent of male respondents indicated that they would respond in a hostile or aggressive manner if a colleague turned out to be homosexual, and about 60 percent of all respondents said that they preferred to maintain social distance from homosexuals. Known homosexuals are effectively excluded from social activities, so it is not a surprise that most homosexuals in the service seem to prefer not to declare their sexual orientation for fear of either being attacked or excluded. Research has documented the persistence of discrimination in the face of non-discriminatory policies.

Table 24. Personnel Policies Regarding Military Service by Gay Men and Lesbians in NATO and ISAF Partner Nations			
Permit Gay/Lesbian Open Service, or No Ban on Homosexual Conduct		Exclude Gays and Lesbians, or Open Service	Undetermined
<b>Albania</b> <b>Australia</b> <b>Austria</b> <b>Azerbaijan</b> <b>Belgium</b> <b>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</b> <b>Canada</b> <b>Croatia</b> <b>Czech Republic</b> <b>Denmark</b> <b>Estonia</b> <b>Finland</b> <i>France</i> <b>Georgia</b> <b>Germany</b> <b>Greece</b> <i>Hungary</i> <i>Iceland</i>	<b>Ireland</b> <b>Italy</b> <b>Latvia</b> <b>Lithuania</b> <i>Luxembourg</i> <b>Netherlands</b> <b>New Zealand</b> <b>Norway</b> <b>Portugal</b> <b>Republic of Korea</b> <b>Romania</b> <b>Slovakia</b> <b>Slovenia</b> <b>Spain</b> <b>Sweden</b> <b>Ukraine</b> <b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>Bulgaria</b> <b>Jordan</b> <b>Poland</b> <b>Turkey</b> <b>United Arab Emirates</b> <b>United States</b>	<b>Republic of Macedonia</b> <b>Singapore</b>

**Nations in Bold:** Official Government Information, *Nations in Italics:* Secondary Source Data

Table 2. (DADT Reax November, 2010) (From The Atlantic, 2010)

Table 2 shows a very important fact that the U.S., only as recently as 2010, was one of the last major developed countries in world to exclude homosexuals in the military, even though most of the U.S. military policies mirror European countries that allow open homosexuals in the military. Israel homosexual's policy would have probably been what the U.S. military policy makers utilized, because it has fought so many wars effectively.

Homosexuals have always been allowed to serve in the military in Israel, but they were generally restricted to units where they could live at home, and were prohibited from occupying intelligence and other sensitive positions. In 1993, the Israeli Defense Force lifted all restrictions on homosexuals in military service.

Homosexuals are not excluded from the draft (women in U.S. military are), nor are they asked about their sexual orientation as part of the accession process. Table 2 shows us that the U.S. is one of six countries in the world that did not allow homosexuals to serve openly. There is no evidence that careerists are restricted in assignments or promotion. When a soldier's homosexual orientation causes him to have a difficult time of adjusting to a unit, he may be moved to a new unit. This behavior, however, is treated no differently from any other type of adjustment problem. Israeli society still has strong taboos against homosexual behavior, although people are very tolerant of it. Almost no one openly declares his or her sexual orientation. As in many other cultures and countries, this social censoring of all public sexual behavior has probably prevented major problems from occurring in the military and other social organizations. That Israeli soldiers are used to mixed-sex housing has undoubtedly contributed to lack of problems with the service of homosexuals. Although the Israelis believe they have successfully integrated homosexuals into the military with no negative effects on cohesion and performance, they have not studied the impact, nor do they have any plans to do so. Moreover, the Israeli Defense Force does not conduct any training of its leadership or unit personnel about matters of sexual orientation, nor does it plan to do so.

## **1. Summary**

Tolerance of homosexuality or national movements in that direction, rather than active integration, appears to be cultural norm. The notable exception is the Netherlands, which has taken an activist role toward integrating homosexuals into society in general and the military in particular. In most Western countries, including the Netherlands, homosexuals who serve in the military do so without revealing their sexual preferences. Heterosexuality is still the norm for the vast majority of those in Western life

homosexuality will likely to remain shunned. As a result, homosexual “bashing” may be a particular problem for military services, especially in countries where bans against homosexuals in military service have only recently been removed. To derive lessons from these changes, it is imperative that social scientists continue to study countries that recently removed restrictions on homosexuals in the military. Women and African-Americans in uniform are less strongly opposed, although they are more strongly opposed than their civilian counterparts. Moreover, attitudes measured in surveys conducted so far have not accounted for the impact of social norms on regulating such behavior are vague as to specific action and context and do not assess what the effects of social norms in the military unit would be.

The failure of surveys of military personnel to measure attitudes appropriately may lie in their construction. The surveys conducted so far have been of a purely pragmatic nature, with no attention to the theory of attitude-behavior linkage. To assess more realistically the likelihood of negative behavioral consequences of homosexuals serving in the military, there needs to be a construct of surveys that measure the attitudes and intentions at the same level of generality and include some measure of social norms with respect to the behavior in question. Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action (1975) has proved enlistment and retention behavior. It is known that there are those in the military services who likely can tolerate homosexuals, but know accept them fully. As seen in the countries discussed, even the most liberal societies did not fully accept homosexuals and homosexuality in the military. Given the attitudes of the general public regarding homosexuality, the United States is not an exception to this trend either. Society was liberalized first with respect to homosexuals and the military followed, not the reverse. Exclusion of one’s sexuality, as well as race and gender, from the workplace appears to be emerging as a norm in Western societies that will regulate homosexual as well as heterosexual behavior in the countries studied appears to have had a dampening effect on many of the problems that might arise with the lifting of restrictions on the military service of homosexuals. In the U.S. a study conducted said at least 45percent of homosexuals are excluded in the workplace, strictly based on sexual preference. The

process is far from complete however, and the path to resolution may be a difficult one in nations such as the United States, which have traditionally held strong exclusionary attitudes toward homosexuals in military service. Now by viewing other countries policies of homosexual's in the military, this lead to the next chapter of "The Jigsaw Classroom" that was used to help society desegregate their classrooms, thus taking a step forward in ending "separate but equal"; in ways this can help to eliminate the homophobic attitudes people display in society today.

## **F. THE JIGSAW CLASSROOM**

The Jigsaw classroom which was started by Dr. Elliot Aronson observed that there was a major decline in the effectiveness of three distinct institutions: family, community, and religion. In response to these trends, society had placed education as the catalyst to solve this issue; at the same time, education was receiving less support from the other three institutions for accomplishing this task sounds eerily familiar. The major social issue during this time for education to solve was segregation, which today is a different type of segregation in society that affects homosexuals. In 1954, the Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in *Brown vs. The Board of Education, Topeka, Kansas*, seemed very appropriately to suggest that segregated educational facilities are by their very nature discriminatory and for that reason unconstitutional. (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Snapp, 1978 p.11) At the same time the justices even went so far as to base their arguments for the majority decision on experimental research data obtained by social scientists that pointed out the negative effect of segregated educational institutions on African-Americans. As a product of the inner-city school system, there was a significant knowledge disparity level between white versus black students. More importantly, taking into account the fact that educational technology has been sufficiently lacking in the African-American schools and how to develop a program to help even the learning level for African-American students. So, Dr. Elliot Aronson a professor at the University of Texas used the designing of research studies to examine ways of applying social psychological findings to education. His studies helped students of different ethnicities

to get along better in school, by making them interact with each other on various projects were the students had to depend on one another to accomplish certain task. A jigsaw student is challenged to develop empathy and tolerance, and must learn to work effectively toward common goals with persons differing from themselves in experience and capability. (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Snapp, 1978 p.37) This would work well in adapting homosexuals into society if they were to apply the same technique. Even racial slurs can be reduced in a jigsaw classroom, because it provides the students with an opportunity for observing their own behavior as it affects others. Finally, the children in jigsaw classrooms have shown a greater ability to put themselves in the role of another person, even outside of the school environment, which helps society end prejudices and hatred of out-group members

#### **G. HOMOSEXUALS IN THE U.S. MILITARY**

Is the U.S. military capable of integrating openly homosexual personnel into its ranks while maintaining its ability to accomplish its mission? Would you prefer to serve in a command without any homosexual personnel? Table 3 provides some interesting insight into the level of discomfort (denoted as Social Intolerance) by Americans toward three different groups of people. The social intolerance of homosexuals being neighbors in U.S. communities is higher than that of Muslims and immigrants or foreign workers, even after September 11, 2001. The theory of ambiguation, is a concept from the work of Lawrence Lessig. Lessig argues that people can deploy rhetorical devices to change a society's shared understanding of the meaning conveyed by a given word or action. One of the rhetorical devices Lessig discusses is "ambiguation," which gives "the particular act, the meaning of which is to be regulated, a second meaning as well, if one that acts to undermine the negative effects of the first." (Brown & Ayres 2004 p. 151) If heterosexuals soldiers are willing to serve with openly homosexual soldiers then they might be looked upon as homosexual themselves. This has been the crux of the dilemma that has plagued us for decades. Society in general has not begun the allowance of homosexuals in the military because homosexuals are incapable of military service

because they are not competent to perform their duties and because they pose security risks. Discussions and comments from senatorial hearings at the time of the DADT compromise were framed largely around the assumption that people do not want to share such intimate spaces with someone who could potentially be attracted to them. These statements often included direct references to the discomfort service members would face at having to share close environments (especially showers) with known homosexuals. This discomfort was often characterized as an invasion of privacy. The implicit fear was of having to face unwanted sexual advances; this is the reason that men and women tend to be given separate facilities in the military (cf. Shawver 1995; though in some combat situations, even this is not always the case). Sociologist Charlie Moskos said, "If feelings of privacy for women are respected regarding privacy from men, then we must respect those of straights with regard to homosexuals" (Shawver 1995, p. 158). These arguments, however, have now largely fallen by the wayside. High-ranking military officers recently before the abolishing of DADT have stated publicly that homosexual personnel are generally competent at their jobs. The same instances of integration of African-Americans was the concern that unit cohesion would decline, with a consequent reduction in unit performance; that heterosexuals' fear about privacy and foxholes with homosexual personnel; and that heterosexuals' antipathy toward homosexuals would lead to violence and breakdowns in the command structure. Even since the dawn of the republic, government decisions have always been made about who shall be permitted or required to serve in the military, and under what conditions. The decisions have frequently reflected societal attitudes toward members of particular groups. Before the 1940s, the act of engaging in sodomy had been conducted proof enough to periodically purge the military units of persons suspected of engaging in homosexual acts. (Herek, Jobe, Carney, 1996, p.94) The military's prohibitions focused on homosexual behaviors, however, not on homosexual identity. As psychological screening became a part of the induction process in the 1940s, the military adopted American psychiatry's view of homosexual behavior as an indicator of psychopathology. The military's focus shifted from conduct to status—from homosexual acts to homosexual persons. As with the case

earlier in the study of African-Americans, however, homosexual Americans were allowed to serve in the armed services only when personnel shortages necessitated it. When expansions of the war effort required that all available personnel be utilized, screening procedures were loosened and many homosexuals were allowed to enlist and serve. This policy only lasted for a short time until the need for recruits diminished near the war's end, after that anti-homosexual policies were enforced with increasing vigilance and veracity, forcing homosexuals to be discharged involuntarily, usually with considerable stigma that followed them into civilian life. In 1982, the military's policy concerning homosexuality was revised. According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the revision was undertaken primarily for three reasons: (1) to establish uniform procedures concerning homosexuality across the service branches; (2) to clarify the specific actions for which a person could be separated; and (3) to define the extenuating circumstances under which persons found to have engaged in those actions might nevertheless be retained (GAO, 1992a). The 1982 policy stated that "Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military environment of persons who may engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct will seriously impair the accomplishment of the military mission." (Herek, Jobe, Carney, 1996 p.7) This impairment was presumed to occur because the presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the military services to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among service members; to ensure the integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of service members who frequently must live and work under close conditions affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the military services; to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches of security. (DoD Directive 1332.14, 1982)






Table 3. Who do Americans Prefer not to Have as Neighbors? (Sociological Images, 2006) (From Lisa Wade, 2010)

From 1980 to 1990, the military discharged at least 16,919 homosexuals under the separation category of homosexuality. By the beginning of 1993, it appeared that the military's homosexual ban would soon be overturned. Nine days after the inauguration of President Bill Clinton, he announced that he would fulfill a campaign pledge and end the exclusion of homosexuals from military service. He asked Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to prepare within six months a draft of a policy to end discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and he proposed to use the interim period to resolve "the real, practical problems that would be involved" in implementing such a policy. (Herek, Jobe, Carney, Ralph 1996 p. 9)

Clinton's proposal was greeted with intense opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of Congress led by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), conservative Republicans, and religious fundamentalists. After negotiation with Nunn and other members of Congress, the president publicly directed his secretary of defense to draft a plan for reversing the ban. In the interim, he ordered an immediate halt to the practice of asking new recruits about their sexual orientation, and suspended discharge proceedings based solely on sexual orientation. The RAND report (National Defense Research Institute, 1993) ultimately concluded that the military could successfully reverse the ban, provided sufficient leadership was exercised. The secretary of defense and the president,

however, rejected most of the report in favor of recommendations by the military panel. They announced a compromise with Nunn, which they coined the name “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue.” (Lehring, 2003, p.217) Under its terms, personnel would not be asked about their sexual orientation and would not be discharged simply for being homosexuals; engaging in sexual conduct with a member of the same sex, however, would still constitute grounds for discharge. Since its enactment, numerous charges have surfaced that the policy does not protect homosexual service members from harassment or witch-hunts, and that it has actually increased the number of discharges for homosexuality. As seen in (Table 4), societal acceptance of homosexuals in the military incrementally increased after President Clinton pledge to end the policy of homosexuals not being allowed to serve in the military.




Table 4. Increasing U.S. Public Support for Gays in the Military (Sociological Images, 2010) (From Gwen Sharp, 2010)

In the fall of 1993, Congress voted to codify most aspects of the ban an outcome that the president initially had tried to avoid through his compromise. The congressional action was widely regarded as a retrenchment to an even more repressive military policy. One homosexual activist characterized it as “an ignominious defeat” for Clinton’s compromise. (Herek, Jobe, Carney, Ralph 1996 p. 9) The new policy contained four

principal innovations. First, it distinguished homosexual orientation—which it defined as an “abstract desire”—from a propensity to engage in sexual acts with someone of the same sex. Second, it eliminated questions about sexual orientation from enlistment procedures. Third, it permitted associational activity, such as going to a homosexual bar or reading homosexual publication—provided that the individual did not indicate a propensity for homosexual conduct. Finally, it provided some discretion to commanding officers, which apparently allowed for more or less zealous attempts to separate homosexuals from military service.

### **1. Military Policy for Homosexuals**

Congress and the media in the 1990s framed specific questions of whether homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the military. Slightly below the surface, however, raged a more general argument about the treatment of homosexuals as a whole in society. At roughly the same time that the military policy debate was occurring, conservatives and religious fundamentalists in several states were attempting to abolish local legislation that protects homosexuals from discrimination. Although the military was believed to be a progressive force for racial equality in America in the past, it still was generally a conservative institution, especially in the realm of sexual politics. Like other secular in-group organizations in the country, the military which is a male-dominated institution has members generally subscribe to the American ideology of masculinity and its attendant attitudes concerning gender and sexuality. Even as official policy was changed, civilian society made a slower transition of acceptance, as indicated by the military’s ongoing struggles with the problem of sexual harassment. Another problem with staging a fight for homosexual rights in the military arena was that, until very recently, the judiciary has historically deferred to DoD in cases of discriminatory practices against homosexuals as it relates to matters in the civilian world—such as freedom of speech and expression—are not always assured to the men and women whose primary mission is to defend those rights from foreign threats. Thus, at the time of national debate concerning homosexual people in the military, political conservatives

(both leaders and members of the general public) had a strong ideological affiliation with the military whereas liberals generally did not. Liberals, in contrast, have been more sympathetic to homosexuals. But many liberals (homosexual and heterosexual alike) experienced ambivalence about the military issue as a result of their support for employment equality for homosexuals, on the one hand, and their general antimilitary stance on the other. As a result, antigay conservatives were far more comfortable than were most homosexual-supportive liberals in arguing about how to maintain the military's morale and fighting effectiveness. The debate surrounding homosexual people in the military is probably best regarded as one small skirmish in the ongoing struggle to determine American society's attitude toward its homosexual citizens. A disturbing trend is that there are no studies conducted in the military on sexual activity of its service members, and the same for data showing percentages of homosexual behavior among those currently serving in the armed forces either. The only study that was conducted came from three national probability samples that included data on old military manning statuses. These data suggest that the prevalence of same-gender sexual behavior by men who have served in the military is at the high end of the range for the general population (Rogers and Turner, 1991). (Herek, Jobe, Carney, Ralph 1996 p. 22) This behavior may or may not have occurred during their military service. Rogers and Turner (1991) report an analysis combining data from three probability samples of the U.S. population (combined n = 2,449 respondents) that examines the proportion of men aged twenty-one and older who reported adult same-gender sexual experience by various social and demographic characteristics, including military service. Among men with military service, 7.6 percent reported same-gender sexual contact, compared with 5.1 percent of other men. Military service was one of only four adult status variables that showed a reliable statistical relationship with reports of same-gender sex across the three surveys.

In the end the need for change to military policy towards homosexuals came from the support for a strong military establishment that was linked to societal change in society's acceptance of homosexuals. The change to homosexuals policies in the military only helped to reinforce that society was changing to a more inclusive culture, were one's

sexual orientation does not dictate one's leadership ability or combat effectiveness. The change to policy shows (Figure 7) that the U.S. today is one of only a handful of countries that has allowed homosexuals to serve openly in the military based on this study. Culture always has the ability to look past its prejudices and come to some sort of cohesion when faced either with a greater threat that could destroy their way of life, or when placed in a situation that makes change to the societal policies that force people to work together to reach a common goal like: "The Jigsaw Classroom" or U.S. wars.

Figure 7 depicts areas where gays can openly serve in the military:




Figure 7. Map of the Day (The Daily Beast September, 2011) (From, Andrew Sullivan, 2011)

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## **V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. CONCLUSION**

The initial objective of this thesis was to investigate how the use of framing through social influences as in desegregation of the military, helped to make the smooth transition from “Don’t ask Don’t tell”. During the investigation it was discovered that framing did not stand-alone as the effective means for change, but that of the jigsaw classroom theory in conjunction with framing greatly incited the probability of change. The theories behind using substantive and procedural frames of social influence have been analyzed using the case study research model. The case of African-American military competency study examined how framing tactics have been used historically to influence individual decision makers as well as how individual decision makers have used framing to influence a group. The case study analysis illustrates that framing impacts the decision stages of the decision making process. Communicators provide information that they know will impact an individual’s cognitive development. Framing tactics are effective means of influencing both groups and individuals due to their ability to shape the psychological landscape. Branch Rickey’s method is a useful tool for evaluating the impact of framing influence on the decision making during the integration of baseball as the byproduct of ending DADT. Although DADT has been abolished, this study will help in-groups/out-groups better understand how to cohabitate with one another for the betterment of our society.

### **B. RECOMMENDATION**

The case of African-American military competency study provided considerable insight into the effectiveness of framing tactics on influencing both groups and individuals.

While the differences between African-Americans and homosexuals are evident, they both have valuable references for developing a set of recommendations of framing tactics to influence military or society the decision makers on the policies of integration. These recommendations are offered as answers to the following four questions:

**Q1. How did policy makers (senior executives) use framing and what steps (cascade model), if any did they utilize in changing the sociological perspective of the culture?**

Policy makers used framing of an overt nature, which first required mandatory racial exclusion, but in the end shifted to a formal racial integration and ostensibly race-neutral personnel policies. This outcome was not inevitable and, as we have tried to demonstrate throughout our study, it defies easy explanations. The long, convoluted, and ultimately successful process of desegregating the armed forces resulted from complex interactions between military specific concerns and the broader politics of race and civil rights in the mid-twentieth century. Major changes in the status of African-Americans and homosexuals in the military were thoroughly political in nature. The content and timing of all key policy decisions were indelibly shaped by intense public debate, interest-group lobbying, and partisan electoral rivalries. Policy implementation, in turn, emerged from equally intense bureaucratic politics and complicated negotiations among multiple government agencies. Leadership mattered greatly in determining the extent and pace of change in military race relations. Major steps toward racial equality came most readily when high-ranking officials demonstrated firm, consistent support for such actions. Civilians, rather than senior officers of the uniformed services, usually originated policy changes, nonetheless, uniformed officers also made important contributions, and good civilian-military cooperation was essential to ensuring the implementation of new policies. Ideas about how race affected military performance had a powerful impact upon the choices that policymakers made. The most common arguments in favor of abolishing DADT either claimed that homosexuals would destroy the integrity of rank and command structures, privacy of males, and recruitment of new service members. Policy makers understood that these assumptions were unsubstantiated without any factual data.



**Q2. What framing strategies were used for internal (military members) and external (U.S. society as a whole) during desegregation: substantive or procedural?**

Military members and the U.S. society as a whole was often the target of substantive framing strategy. This was done at “face value” in Chapter IV to see what made the military decision makers change their long standing policy of discrimination for homosexuals and African-Americans and the consequences they would face if they did not allow the integration of (out-groups) into their organization. The substantive frame refers to the material aspects or the facts of the dispute in this study to see what the military were stating the reasons for not allowing the integration of African-Americans and homosexuals. The facts were in dispute of desegregation, were it not just being an impartial dream or abstract moral consideration, but an organizational necessity for the military and society as a whole to function more effectively. The main frames that came from desegregation were better unit cohesion and efficient fighting troops would come into play if the services ended discrimination. As Dr. Pratkanis states in one of the nine principles of the Jackie Robinson case study, “create the psychology of inevitable change” and this will encourage change in the in-group members to the new social change structure. This outcome was inevitable in the end and the military members or society could be nothing but conform to the new standards of acceptance of African-Americans and homosexuals. The following list is adopted and modified from Pratkanis’ recommendations for framing tactics. It offers nine measures for the military or society strategy to follow to use in framing issue in a substantive way to influence your intended target.

**1. Create the Psychology of Inevitable Change**

This principle can increase the racial factor psychologically, if you let members of the military know that homosexuals will be able to openly serve in the military soon and there is nothing they can do about it. Politicians and military leaders both have a responsibility to fully support homosexuals in the military, then the rest of society will

fall in line, because it will encourage change in the in-group members to the new social change structure.

## **2. Establish Equal Status Contact with a Superordinate Goal**

Most people believe that homosexuals military members, just like their African-American counterparts, intergroup contact with other service members would lead to altercations. Social Psychologists and sociologists came up with the equal status contact hypothesis. Stating positive intergroup relations can happen when the members from both groups: 1) have equal status, 2) same goals, 3) are dependent of each other to accomplish a specific task, and 4) interact with the support of the authorities, rules, or customs.

## **3. The Pee Wee Reese Principle: Puncture the Norm of Prejudice**

Norms are the leading factor that insight the prejudices of society. A norm is a rule or expectation used to guide and direct social behavior (e.g., homosexuals don't openly serve in the military with other service members; African-Americans are not good at math or science). Norms can prescribe what "ought" to happen in a social situation and can describe how most people will act in a setting. Norms gain their power from the belief that social sanctions will result if the norm is transgressed. Numerous social psychological studies have demonstrated the importance of social norms in maintaining prejudice. Although norms are powerful and persistent, they can be changed. One dissenter can shatter the power of group pressure and norms. Ordinarily the factors leading individuals to form attitudes of prejudice are not piecemeal. The reason most people are prejudiced is the need to feel secure. One of the ways to rectify this is by using "norms" to guide and change the social behavior of homosexuals serving openly in the military.

#### **4. Practice Nonviolent Resistance**

As the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. used in the civil rights movements of the 1960s to gain equal status for African-Americans, nonviolence can change the dynamics of social interaction. Nonviolent action says, “No matter what you do to me, I will not hurt you; I will, however, continue to move to the new goal of racial equality.” The same can be said for homosexuals who are attacked and beaten for being different. If the person wants to change something, then they will have to do it with closed fist, and it forces that enemy to be converted to your cause.

#### **5. Create Empathy**

An in-group can feel emotion or empathy for a out-group that can help change the prejudices the in-group members have for that particular out-group. This is true if one person sees another person in pain, empathy forces the person to feel sorrow for that individual, no matter what race he/she is. When people have homosexual friends, they are more receptive to fight for equality for the particular dimension.

#### **6. Individuate the New Group Member**

One problem that occurs when an out-group member joins an in-group is the continued categorization of the new member in terms of out-group stereotypes—the person is not “homosexual” but a military service member. This can cause problems for labeling such categories for integration. Somebody can always throw rocks from afar, but never do the same when face-to-face with the human being of the stereotype. Out-group stereotypes originate from in-group members in part to misperceptions or unsubstantiated information that has not been proven scientifically, whereas that new group member (homosexual or African-American) is seen to be here because of situational factors or luck. Another problem is the in-group cannot adjust to the new desegregated environment in their solo or token status. Dr. Pratkanis, said one way to

counter this, is to reduce categorization and encourage the treatment of the new group member as an individual, not a race or sexual gender. (Pratkanis & Turner, 1994 p. 43)

## **7. Offer Forgiveness and Redemption**

In the many ways, the issue of homosexuals in the military and society can be viewed as one elaborate cognitive dissonance experiment-forcing people in the military to confront the Myrdal's dilemma. Through the psychology of the inevitable this places pressure on the military leadership as a whole to change their prejudices of openly homosexual service men and women.

Next the person should block off the negative but typical routes for dealing with Myrdal's dilemma such as denigrating homosexuals, bolstering negative stereotypes, and hatemongering.

## **8. Undo the Perception of Preferential Selection**

Many people doubt homosexuals have the ability to be effective leaders in the military because of their non-masculine nature. "We would argue that exclusion of homosexual men and lesbians is also based on factors unrelated to job performance." (McDaniel, 1989) It can have consequences due to the misperception that homosexuals cannot do their job or perform in combat situations. The perception that homosexuals in society are preferentially hired is ridiculous. Social psychologists have identified two general reasons why affirmative action can be looked upon as preferential selection or treatment. One, that this can be resolved is by reaffirming that the individual was not preferentially selected, and two, make sure everybody knows why that individual was hired, not by policy, but by merits.

## **9. Identify and Remove Institutional Barriers**

Out-groups are excluded from the in-group by more than just interpersonal prejudice; they are restricted on certain institutional practices of choices and rights by in-groups. Such practices can be subtle and restrict the rights of an out-group. Such

practices can be subtle and unintended or blatant and intentional. Complete integration could only occur with the military using voluntary integration as a substitute for the dismantling of the DADT laws of segregation. To accomplish this implementation of policy tolerant to homosexuals will likely require strong civilian authority from the president or the Supreme Court, as well as strong military leadership.

**Q3: What strategies were used to combat counter frames? Where did these counter frames originate?**

African-Americans and homosexuals had in particular similar counter frames the military used when it came to how they were integrated in the armed services. The strategies used to combat the counter frames came from mostly research surveys and interviews from the perspectives of the troops. Most of the origins of the counter frames were the sociological study of various professors and societal culture views during that period. In the thesis study the sociologist countered the militaries and governments stance on discrimination policies in a style that forced serious revisions to the current system. For all the test and biblical references politicians and military brass came up with to deter integration, there was always a counter frame that could refute it, because either the test had no actual scientific proven data, or the claims made by government officials were considered hearsay. Counter frames is one method of influencing decision making targets that correlates to framing social influence. It is not defined as a social influence tactic; however, it is often used to support framing influence. Conversely, framing influence tactics was used to strengthen the impact for integrating of homosexuals into the military by decision makers. Military commanders believed that African-American soldiers were lazy and didn't have the intelligence to perform certain duties in the military. An example of a counter frame is during World War I, staff officers saw that the African-American soldiers fought exceptionally well in conflicts of different variations of duties. (Mandelbaum, 1952, p. 90) Camaraderie is often used to frame a reason why homosexuals/African-Americans were not allowed to serve in the armed services. The framing that the military uses is that homosexuals will decrease the military's ability to function by harming the military's strong levels of camaraderie and cohesion within the ranks. As in the same sense of integrating the African-American

soldiers, the counter frame would be it is not the issue with “camaraderie”, in more of the fear and hostility that homosexuals would elicit from other soldiers is the main point here.

**Q4. Ultimately, what lessons (good and bad) from these historical cases can be used to effectively integrate homosexuals into the military?**

Foster mutual trust and confidence in a military setting to being totally dependent on each other for completion of the mission and, perhaps, survival. Personnel stereotypes of homosexual men are characterized as lacking sufficient aggression, physical strength, and stamina for combat they cannot be trusted to come to the aid of another service member. This is one of the reasons straight men would not accept homosexual men, men would not bond and unit cohesion would suffer. Homosexuals who subscribe to military values, should work toward breaking down these stereotypes, and do not look or act “different” will not disrupt bonding, thus gaining mutual trust and confidence from there heterosexual brethren.

Ensure the integrity of rank and command so that it is not perceived that homosexuals are using their rank to gain sexual favors from subordinates or giving favors to a superior in return for some benefit. We need to see why the incidence of such occurrences would be no greater among homosexual personnel than among heterosexual personnel. Moreover, the benefit that homosexual leaders would be unable to command the respect and obedience of straight men contradicts history. Alexander the Great and Frederick II of Prussia were acknowledged homosexuals who led victorious armies. The effectiveness of a leader above all should be far more important to his followers than his/her sexual orientation.

Establish privacy standards so straight men’s repulsion of homosexual men’s ogling their bodies in showers or of unwelcome advances is not at the heart of the argument of integration of the services when applied to homosexuals. Men are women’s predators but are discomforted by the thought of becoming the object of the chase. The privacy argument is very weak. As pointed out by RAND researchers (National Defense Research Institute, 1993), service members relinquish full privacy when they join the

armed forces. Moreover, because public accommodations make no distinction based on sexual preference, the courts would not be likely to rule in favor of a heterosexual who felt his privacy rights were abridged by having to live in close quarters with homosexuals.

Recruitment and retention of homosexual can threaten the military's image as a forger of men. The military is a mechanism by which traditional masculine ideology is imparted to men in our culture. If, as Karst (1991) says, the characteristics of a "real" man include dual responses to women—sexual aggression and protection—homosexual men fail the test because they are not interested in women sexually. In addition, part of traditional masculinity is a repression of the "feminine" within oneself (Karst, 1991). (Herek, Jobe, Carney, Ralph 1996 p. 78) The stereotype of homosexual men is that they do not repress their femininity and may actively display it. A military made up of women and homosexual men would represent the antithesis of masculine ideology and, therefore, would be an unattractive career alternative to those who believe the military should embody traditional masculinity and the power associated with it. Therefore, we should focus on the impartiality of the armed services and not on the masculine aspect of it. After all both African-Americans and women were integrated at times when the military thought it would be disastrous for retention and recruitment of men, but it came out in the end as a great benefit for our nation's view to the world on equal opportunity of all races, sexes, and creeds.

### **C. FUTURE WORK**

The future work of this type of study could come from how the integration of women in the military differs or similar to that of homosexuals and African-Americans in the military and what social influence tactics were used to influence the military decision making process. They could look at the framing tactics that were used to influence the military decision makers on integrating women and what counter frames were used to abolish the discrimination policies. Women have been in the military for almost as long as during the birth of this country, yet still cannot be attached to a combat unit or

included when there is a draft. They would see what the framing tactics behind this policy are and what historical examples are used as a reference to disprove that, women are capable of combat duty in our country's armed services. They could conduct a theoretical review of the framing social influence tactics employed in each period of interest and apply it to the military decision. The framing tactics identified in each period of interest will serve as the catalyst between the theories of social influence and military thought process.



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